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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Saunders v. City of Chicago, Tyrone Saunders brought a section 1983
action against the City of Chicago and some of its officers, claiming that the
officers used excessive force while arresting him for alleged domestic
battery.' Before trial, Saunders moved to preclude the defendants from
impeaching him through his prior felony convictions for domestic battery,
violating an order of protection, and possession of a controlled substance.2
In a curt opinion that neither weighed the probative value and prejudicial
effect of the convictions, nor listed the convictions by name, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois permitted the
defendants to impeach Saunders through his convictions in the event that he
chose to testify, concluding that "such convictions are routinely admitted to
impeach." 3
If Saunders were instead a defendant in a criminal case, the court likely
would have reached a different conclusion and almost certainly would have
engaged in a more rigorous analysis of the admissibility of his convictions.
To wit, in United States v. Smith,4 the state charged Louis Stills with

conspiracy to distribute cocaine, distribution of cocaine, distribution of
cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon.5 Stills had three prior felony convictions, but the
prosecution only attempted to use one of the convictions to impeach him6 in
the event that he chose to testify-his 2004 conviction for simple assault.
In resolving Stills's motion to preclude the prosecution from impeaching
him through this conviction, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania engaged in a detailed balancing of the conviction's
probative value and its prejudicial effect based upon four factors: the nature
of the prior crime, the age of the prior conviction, the importance of Stills'
testimony, and the importance of Stills's credibility.7 After this analysis, the
court found that two factors supported admitting the conviction while two
factors weighed against admission, forcing the court to exclude the
conviction because its probative value did not outweigh its prejudicial
effect. 8
Smith is by no means anomalous. Courts in criminal cases typically find
that defendants' convictions for crimes of violence are inadmissible for

1. Saunders v.City of Chicago, 320 F.Supp.2d 735 (N.D.II1.
2004).
2. Id.at 738.
3. Id.
4. 2006 WL 618843 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2006).
5. Id.
6. Id.
at*t.
7. Id. at*2.
8. Id. at *2-3.
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impeachment purposes because such crimes "have little or no direct bearing
on honesty" and are instead thought to result "from a short temper, a
combative nature, extreme provocation, or other causes." 9 So, how can the

exclusion of Stills's conviction for a crime of violence be squared with the
admission of Saunders's conviction for a crime of violence-domestic
battery-as well as the admission of his conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, a crime which is also thought to have little necessary
bearing on veracity?1 °
The answer can be found in Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1): the
felony impeachment rule. Rule 609(a)(1) states that a judge shall admit a
felony conviction against a criminal defendant for impeachment purposes
only upon finding that the probative value of the conviction outweighs its
prejudicial effect, whereas it states that a judge shall admit a felony
conviction against any other witness, including a civil party, as long as the
probative value of the conviction is not substantially outweighed by
considerations such as the danger of unfair prejudice-the balancing test
prescribed by Federal Rule of Evidence 403.1
What do these distinctions mean? It is important to note that neither the
defendants in Saunders nor the prosecution in Smith were trying to use the
convictions at issue as propensity character evidence, whose admission is
generally proscribed by both Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) and state
counterparts.1 2 In other words, the defendants in Saunders were not
attempting to use Saunders's prior domestic battery conviction to prove that
he had a propensity to engage in acts of domestic violence and that he thus
was likely acting in conformity with that propensity by committing domestic
battery at the time that he was arrested;13 indeed, the state subsequently
dropped the domestic violence charges resulting from the incident which
precipitated Saunders's arrest and lawsuit. 14 Instead, the defendants and the
prosecution were attempting to use the convictions to impeach Saunders and
Stills, respectively.

9.
States,
10.
11.

United States v. Cueso, 506 F. Supp. 9, 13 (W.D. Okla. 1979) (citing Gordon v. United
383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1971).

See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
12. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a).
13. See Saunders, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 738. Nor was the prosecution trying to use Saunders's
prior domestic battery conviction more generally to prove that he had a propensity to act violently
and that he thus was likely acting in conformity with that propensity by resisting arrest. See id.
14. Id. Saunders was, however, convicted of misdemeanor resisting arrest in connection with the
incident. See id.
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What this means is that the sole probative value that these courts were
weighing was the probative value that these convictions had for
impeachment purposes, i.e., how much bearing the convictions had on the
honesty and veracity of Saunders and Smith as witnesses. 15 Conversely, the
main prejudice these courts balanced against this probative value was the
evidence
danger that the jury would misuse these convictions "as propensity
'1 6
despite their introduction solely for impeachment purposes."
Applying this analysis to Saunders's conviction for domestic battery, we
see that because Saunders was a civil plaintiff, the court was required to
admit that conviction for impeachment purposes unless the court found that
its bearing on his honesty and veracity-its probative value-was
substantially outweighed by the danger that the jury would use the
conviction to conclude, "[o]nce a domestic batterer, always a domestic
batterer" or "[o]nce a violent criminal, always a violent criminal"--its
unfairly prejudicial effect. Essentially, the court had to admit the conviction
if its probative value and prejudicial effect were roughly commensurate or
even if the conviction's unfairly prejudicial effect outweighed its probative
value, but not to a substantial degree. If, however, Saunders was a criminal
defendant charged with domestic battery, the court could have admitted his
prior domestic battery conviction only if it found that its probative value
outweighed its prejudicial effect. If the conviction's prejudicial effect
outweighed its probative value by any degree or even if its probative value
matched its prejudicial effect, the court would have been required to exclude
it, as the Smith court did.
These disparate balancing tests, however, do not constitute the sole
manner in which courts treat criminal defendants differently from civil
parties under Rule 609(a)(1). 17 Smith is a paradigmatic case of a court
deciding the admissibility of a criminal defendant's conviction for
impeachment purposes by conducting an on-the-record, rigorous balancing
of probative value and prejudicial effect, while Saunders is typical of the
matador-style judging that occurs in cases deciding the admissibility of a
conviction by other witnesses, including civil parties. Moreover, courts
typically place the burden of proof firmly on the prosecution to establish that
a conviction is admissible to impeach a criminal defendant while they
concurrently18 place the same burden on civil parties to exclude such
convictions.
If, however, Saunders were not attempting to preclude his impeachment
but were instead attempting to present opinion or reputation evidence about

15. See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note to the 1990 amendment.
16. Id.
17. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).

18. See infra notes 399-400.
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his character for non-violence or his arresting officers' character for
violence, he would have faced a similar dichotomy. While, as noted,
propensity character evidence is generally inadmissible under Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(a), Rules 404(a)(1) and (2) permit a criminal defendant to
inject the issue of character into his trial under the so-called "mercy rule"
while a similar luxury is not afforded to a civil party.' 9 Such a bright line
distinction, however, was not always in place in all courts. For decades, a
substantial minority of courts gave this same dispensation to parties in quasicriminal cases; i.e., civil proceedings where a judgment rendered against the
party seeking to introduce character evidence necessitated a finding that the
party committed a particular act that was also punishable under criminal law.
Congress finally shut the door to this practice in 2006, at least in cases
governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, by amending Rules 404(a)(1)
and 404(a)(2) to explicitly make them solely applicable in criminal cases
based upon the serious risks of prejudice, confusion, and delay that
propensity character evidence engenders.20
Surprisingly, despite courts largely ignoring the plain language of
various provisions of Rule 609, no court has ever followed suit and treated
civil parties in quasi-criminal cases the same as criminal defendants for Rule
609(a)(1) purposes. This article argues that courts should treat civil parties
in quasi-criminal cases the same as criminal defendants under the felony
impeachment rule because the same factor leading Congress to preclude the
application of the "mercy rule" in quasi-criminal cases-the reluctance to
admit character evidence-cuts sharply in favor of parallel treatment.
Indeed, as things stand, Rule 609(a)(1) is the sole aberration in the
constellation of Federal Rules of Evidence dealing with propensity character
evidence or evidence which can be misused as propensity character
evidence, 2' with every other Rule making it either: (a) as difficult to admit
such evidence in civil trials as it is in criminal trials, or (b) more difficult to
admit such evidence in civil trials than it is in criminal trials.
Part II of this article traces the ban on the admission of propensity
character evidence, as well as its exceptions and qualifications, from the
Norman conquest of England to the American common law and the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 2 Part II pays particular
attention to the split among courts as to whether the "mercy rule" applies

19.
20.
21.
22.

See FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(1)-(2).
See infra Part II.C.2.ii.3.
See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
See infra notes 26-215.

1001

HeinOnline -- 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 1001 2008-2009

solely in quasi-criminal cases and the reasons why Congress finally
circumscribed its use to criminal cases in 2006.23 Part III deals with the
development and refinement of the rules regarding the impeachment of
witnesses through convictions, with an emphasis on the tortured
development and refinement of the felony impeachment rule.24 Finally Part
IV concludes that courts should correct the anomaly and treat civil parties in
quasi-criminal cases the same as criminal defendants under the felony
impeachment rule because the same factor supporting the exclusion of the
"mercy rule" in quasi-criminal trials-limiting the introduction of character
evidence-supports such parallel treatment. 25
II.

THE BAN ON PROPENSITY CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
AND QUALIFICATIONS

A.

A Definition ofPropensity CharacterEvidence

"Propensity character evidence" can generally be defined as the use of
evidence of a person's character or trait of character to prove that he has a
propensity to act in a specific manner and thus that he likely acted in
conformity with that propensity at the time of an alleged pre-trial wrong.26
Alternatively, it can be defined more simply as evidence whose probative
value depends upon the aphorism, "[o]nce a criminal, always a criminal,"
such as evidence that a person on trial for assault had committed assault
before or had a reputation for being violent.2 7
B. The Star Chamber and the Origins of the CharacterEvidence
Proscription

In England, prior to the seventeenth century, courts admitted almost any
type of evidence, with the only limitation being rules deeming certain
categories of individuals "incompetent" to testify at trial. 2' All other forms
of evidence were admissible under the inquisitorial system, which had

23. See infra notes 26-215.
24. See infra notes 216-427.
25. See infra notes 428-462.
26. See Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of CharacterEvidence in Rape
Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 668 (1998) ("The traditional rule prohibits circumstantial use of
character evidence, known as 'propensity' evidence, whereby evidence of a person's particular
characteristic or trait is offered to argue that the person acted in conformity with that trait or
characteristic.").
27. Cf United States v. Rubio-Estrada, 857 F.2d 845, 852 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that Rule
404(b) allows for the admission of non-propensity character evidence whose "probative value does
not rely on the aphorism 'once a criminal, always a criminal').
28. Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in
FederalCriminal Trials, 50 U. CN. L. REV. 713, 716 (1981).
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reigned in England since the Norman conquest and which found an
evidentiary code unnecessary. 9 Under this system, "it was not considered
irregular to call witnesses to prove a prisoner's bad character in order to
raise a presumption of his guilt."3 °

This open door policy with regard to propensity character evidence
could be explained by the inquisitorial system's assumption that the accused
committed a crime and the concomitant requirement that he affirmatively
prove his innocence.31
One of the most conspicuous consumers of
propensity character evidence, and ultimately the harbinger of its death, was
The Court of Star Chamber.32 Established in 1487, 33 the Star Chamber was
an expeditious way for the Tudors and Stuarts to exorcise political and
religious dissenters of the monarchy while masquerading as a court
conducting treason trials.34 The Star Chamber was the Crown's "organ of
terror, renown[ed] among the citizenry for its arbitrary and cruel
decisions, '35 and one of its most capricious practices was the deluge of
character evidence it admitted,36 resulting in defendants being punished for
their sordid character rather than their culpable conduct.37

29. See Mason Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence, 27 IOWA L. REV. 213, 216-17 (1942). "After
the Norman conquest, the inquisitorial system of trial developed in England .... An evidentiary
system remained unnecessary because the jury of inquisitors was composed of those who knew the
facts and therefore they did not rely upon the presentation of evidence for information." Glen
Weissenberger, Making Sense of Extrinsic Act Evidence: FederalRule of Evidence 404(b), 70 IOWA
L. REV. 579, 583 n.17 (1985)
30. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 190-91 (2003) (quoting
I JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 368 (1883)).
31. Reed, supranote 28, at 716-17.
32. See Andrew King-Ries, True to Character: Honoring the Intellectual Foundations of the
CharacterEvidence Rule in Domestic Violence Prosecutions,23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 313, 345
n. 182 (2004) ("Some scholars have observed that the ban on character evidence originated as a direct
procedural response to the inquisitorial practices of the Star Chamber.").
33. William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the "PerSe" Rule: Justice Stewart's
Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1022
n.34 (1994).
34. Reed, supra note 28, at 716-17.
35. Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creationand the CulturalHeritage: A Comparison of
Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361, 381 n.135
(1998).
36. See Jason M. Brauser, Intrinsic or Extrinsic?: The Confusing Distinction Between
Inextricably Intertwined Evidence and Other Crimes Evidence Under Rule 404(b), 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1582, 1591-92 (1994) (noting that the use of character evidence was "one of the most arbitrary
practices of the Star Chamber").
37. Mark A. Sheft, Comment, FederalRule of Evidence 413: A DangerousNew Frontier,33
Am. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 86-87 (1995).
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The Star Chamber engendered widespread animosity in the citizenry in
the years preceding the English Civil War, eventually prompting the
revolutionary Long Parliament to abolish it in 1641." At the close of the
Civil War, the Restoration, and the Glorious Revolution the same dissidents
who were subjected to the monarchy's organ of terror had wrested control of
the Parliament but still felt the sting of the Star Chamber.3 9 In an effort to
prevent the ills of the past from infecting the future, these new power
wielders passed the Treason Act of 1695,40 which, inter alia, contained a
provision proscribing prosecutors from proving at trial any overt acts by the
defendant which were not charged in the indictment, thus precluding the
admission of propensity character evidence.41 While this prohibition on
propensity character evidence was initially limited to treason trials, 42 it soon
permeated all criminal trials, with courts and commentators recognizing that
the use of such evidence violated the right to due process of law guaranteed
by the Magna Carta. 4
C. Across the Pond: The American Adoption ofthe Propensity Character
Evidence Proscription
1. American Common Law
i.

The GeneralBan on Propensity CharacterEvidence

Eventually, the English ban on propensity character evidence carried
across the pond, with American courts in both civil and criminal cases
adopting a similar exclusionary rule in the middle of the nineteenth century,
"directly influenced by the Treason Act of 1695 and other English
authorities." 44 Indeed, in holding in 1892 that a trial court erred in admitting
evidence indicating that two defendants on trial for murder had previously
committed robberies, the United States Supreme Court forcefully stated that:

38. David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties Implications
of Terrorism Litigation,21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 247, 331-32 (1996).
39. See Brauser, supra note 36, at 1591 ("Following the Civil Wars, the Restoration, and the
Glorious Revolution, many of the dissidents whom the Court of Star Chamber had persecuted found
themselves in power.").
40. See Jennifer Y. Schuster, Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule 404(b): The Admissibility of
Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 947, 951 (1988) ("Parliament passed the
Treason Act in reaction to the repressive practices of the Court of the Star Chamber, which admitted
evidence of the defendant's prior misconduct as proof of guilt of the crime charged.").
41. Weissenberger, supra note 29, at 579, 603 n.75.
42. Reed, supra note 28, at 717.
43. Schuster, supra note 40, at 952 ("The Treason Act inevitably prompted the development of
the character rule in all criminal trials.").
44. Weissenberger, supra note 29, at 602 n.75.
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Proof of them only tended to prejudice the defendants with the
jurors, to draw their minds away from the real issue, and to produce
the impression that they were wretches whose lives were of no
value to the community, and who were not entitled to the full
benefit of the rules prescribed by law for the trial of human beings
charged with crime involving the punishment of death.... However

depraved in character, and however full of crime their past lives
may have been, the defendants were entitled to be tried upon
competent evidence, and only for the offence charged.45
While this quotation accurately describes the common law judicial
proscription on the introduction of propensity character evidence, there were
also circumstances in which courts allowed for the admission of such
evidence as well as situations in which character evidence was admissible
for reasons other than proving propensity or conformity.
ii. Pandora'sBox: The Mercy Rule for CriminalDefendants (and
Others?)

Under the so-called "mercy rule," a criminal defendant could inject the
issue of character into his trial and present pertinent propensity evidence
concerning his good character and the alleged victim's bad character.46
Accordingly, a defendant charged with assault could have witnesses testify
that he was a peaceable person, and, if he were claiming self-defense, he
could call witnesses to testify that the alleged victim was a violent person.47
Only at that point could the prosecution call witnesses to testify that the
defendant was violent or that the alleged victim was peaceable.48 But if the
defendant did not want propensity character evidence to pervade his trial, all
he needed to do was refrain from presenting his own character witnesses,
and the state would be precluded from presenting its own. Thus Pandora's
Box remained firmly in the criminal defendant's hands.
In most cases, courts did not extend a similar luxury to defendants and
plaintiffs in civil cases, but some courts treated civil parties the same as
criminal defendants if they were parties in quasi-criminal cases, i.e., civil
proceedings where a judgment rendered against the party seeking to

45.
46.
47.
48.

Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892).
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note to the 2006 amendment.
Id.
Id.
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introduce character evidence necessitated a finding that he committed a
particular act that was also punishable under criminal law. 49 For instance, in
Mourikas v. Vardianos, the plaintiff brought an action against the
defendants, Gus, Rebecca, Pete, and Tom Mourikas, alleging that they
converted $15,400 of his property to their own use. 50 After the trial court
entered a judgment against the defendants, they appealed, claiming, inter
alia, that the trial judge erred by permitting the plaintiff to present evidence
of Tom's bad character. 1
In its 1949 opinion affirming the trial court's judgment, the Fourth
Circuit noted that this evidence was not presented until defense counsel
introduced evidence concerning the good character of each of the
defendants.52 The court then found that while the case at hand was not a
criminal case, the defendants' good character evidence was properly
received because the "plaintiffs proof tended to show the commission of a
crime by the defendants, and a finding for the plaintiff would really be
tantamount to a finding that defendants had committed a crime." 53 It then
noted that because the defendants had thus properly introduced good
character evidence about Tom, this in turn opened the door for the plaintiff
to present bad character evidence about Tom "for all purposes. 54
iii.The Non-Marital Sexual Act Exception in Sex Crime Cases

There was one other type of case in which courts typically allowed for
the introduction of propensity character evidence-sex crime cases. Many
courts found that defendants charged with rape (or similar crimes) were
permitted to inquire into any non-marital sexual acts in which their
complainants had engaged to prove their propensity to consent to such
sexual relations and their likely conformity with this propensity, and thus
consent, at the time of the alleged rape.55 In most cases, however, such
inquiry was only permitted if the complainant was a woman.56 The Supreme
Court of Missouri applied this chauvinistic interpretation of evidence law in
State v. Sibley, where it fatuously concluded that "[i]t is a matter of common
knowledge that the bad character of a man for chastity does not even in the

49. See Katherine J. Alprin, Comment, CharacterEvidence in the Quasi-Criminal Trial: An
Argumentfor Admissibility, 73 TUL. L. REv. 2073, 2075 n.3 (1999).
50. 169 F.2d 53, 54 (4th Cir. 1948).
51. Id.at58.
52. Id. at 59.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposalfor
the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765-66 (1986).
at787.
56. Id.

1006

HeinOnline -- 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 1006 2008-2009

Impeachable Offenses?

[Vol. 36: 997, 2009]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

remotest degree affect his character for truth, when based upon that alone,
while it does that of a woman.""
iv. Practicedin the Art of Seduction: Character "In Issue"
In either civil or criminal cases where courts determined that character
was "in issue," they also allowed for the admission of character evidence,
not for propensity or conformity purposes, but because character itself was
an (essential) element of a claim or defense. To wit, under the common law
tort of seduction, a man could be sued for having persuaded a chaste woman
to have sexual intercourse with him based upon a promise of marriage.58
Thus, an element of a defense in such a case was that the alleged victim was
not in fact chaste, permitting the presentation of evidence that she had a
lascivious character or had engaged in prior acts of sexual intercourse.5 9
This type of case provides a nice illustration of why character evidence
in such cases did not require a propensity/conformity analysis. In a
seduction case, the defendant would not be using evidence of the alleged
victim's lascivious character and past acts of sexual intercourse to prove that
she had a propensity to engage in sexual acts and that she likely acted in
conformity with this propensity at the time of the alleged seduction; indeed,
his defense might be that no sexual act occurred between the victim and
himself. Instead, the defendant would be using the evidence to prove that
the alleged victim was not chaste and thus could not be a victim of
seduction.6 °
v.

Other Purposes

In any civil or criminal case, a party could also introduce character
evidence, not to prove propensity/conformity, but instead, for "other
purposes" such as proving:
(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a
common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more

57. State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (Mo. 1895).
58. John H. Arnold, Clergy Sexual Malpractice, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 25,41 (1996).
59. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note; see David Torrance, Evidence of Character in
Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 12 YALE L.J. 352, 355 (1903).
60. Colin Miller, Killed on the Fourth ofJuly: July 4 h Murder Case Helps Explain FederalRule
of Evidence 405(b), EVIDENCE PROF BLOG, July 4, 2008, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidence
prof/2008/07/killed-on-the-f.htnl.
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crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish
the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the
commission of the crime on trial.6'
Character evidence offered to prove these "other purposes" was not,
however, per se admissible. Courts typically indicated that even after
determining that "other act" evidence was relevant to prove a permissible
purpose, they still had to balance its probative value against the risk of unfair
prejudice before admitting such evidence.62
For instance, in the 1969 case, People v. Sam, the defendant was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter in connection with the death of
Salvador Dominguez.63 The defendant admitted that he threw Dominguez
down and stomped on his stomach but claimed that he was acting in selfdefense because Dominguez, a self-proclaimed karate expert, assumed a
karate stance and leaped at him.64 The Supreme Court of California
reversed, finding that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that the
defendant had "(1) kicked his mistress during a drunken quarrel a month
before the fight with Dominguez, and (2) kicked another man during a brawl
more than two years earlier., 65 The court found that the State's argument
that this evidence was admissible to prove the defendant's criminal intent
and negate his claim of self-defense was attenuated and outweighed by its
prejudicial effect.66 Thus, it deemed the evidence inadmissible because the
possibility that the jury might misuse the evidence as an indication that the
defendant had a propensity to act violently and thus likely acted in
conformity with that propensity by violently attacking Dominguez
outweighed any probative value that the evidence had for establishing
criminal intent.67
Finally, even when courts determined that character evidence
successfully navigated this probative value and prejudicial effect tightrope,
they still only admitted such evidence under the "limited admissibility
doctrine," meaning that it was only admitted for the particular permissible
purpose, such as proving intent.68 Accordingly, the party against whom such
character evidence was offered could ask for and receive a limiting
instruction informing the jury that the evidence was to be considered solely

61. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293 (N.Y. 1901).
62. People v. Gay, 28 Cal. App. 3d 661, 669 (App. 1972).
63. 454 P.2d 700, 701 (Cal. 1969).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 702.
Id.at 706.
Id. at 706-07.
Id.
Gay, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 669.
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as evidence of a permissible purpose such as intent and not as propensity
character evidence.69
vi. Impeachment

In either a civil or criminal case, a testifying party or other witness could
be impeached through character evidence bearing upon his honesty or
veracity. 0 Impeachment evidence was, in one sense, propensity character
evidence because it asked the jury to conduct a propensity/conformity
analysis. But the analysis to be performed was not the analysis proscribed
by the propensity character evidence ban: that a witness had a propensity to
act in specific manner and thus that he likely acted in conformity with that
propensity at the time of an alleged pre-trial wrong. Instead, impeachment
evidence was solely to be used by jurors as evidence that a witness had a
propensity to act dishonestly and that he thus likely acted in conformity with
this propensity by testifying dishonestly at trial.7
Because of this purpose behind impeachment, courts only allowed
witnesses and testifying parties to be impeached through reputation or72
opinion evidence concerning their truth, veracity, and possibly morality.
Moreover, evidence that a testifying defendant had a reputation for
committing the same class of crimes as the one for which he was charged
was inadmissible based upon the fear that it would be misused by the jury as
propensity character evidence rather than as evidence casting doubt on the
truthfulness of his testimony.73 Courts also deemed evidence inadmissible if
it indicated that an individual had committed a specific crime or bad act,
such as adultery, as opposed to evidence about his general reputation for
committing such crimes.74 The only exception to this proscription was that

courts would allow for the admission of evidence that a witness or testifying

69. See, e.g., State v. Scown, 312 S.W.2d 782, 789 (Mo. 1958) ("[T]he objecting party may, if he
desires, request a limiting instruction.").
70. See, e.g., State v. Wellman, 161 S.W. 795, 800 (Mo. 1913).
71. See id. ("Evidence of bad character on the part of defendant was not evidence of his guilt, but
in this case was admitted solely to impeach and discredit his testimony as a witness.").
72. See, e.g., State v. Baird, 195 S.W. 1010, 1013 (Mo. 1917) ("[Sbo alone the question of their
reputations for truth and veracity was involved, or at most this phase of reputation and that of
morality.").
73. See, e.g., Wellman, 161 S.W. at 799 (finding that the trial court's admission of testimony
about whether the "defendant had the reputation of committing the class of crimes for which he was
then on trial" was erroneous).
74. Id.
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party had been convicted of a specific crime under certain circumstances.7 5
Moreover, under the common law "voucher rule," parties were precluded
from impeaching witnesses whom they had called based upon the
presumption "that the calling party vouched for the witness' [s] credibility. 76
A party also could not bolster his witness's credibility until after the
opposing party impeached his credibility." Finally, the party against whom
impeachment evidence was offered could ask for and receive a limiting
instruction informing the jury that evidence was to be considered solely for
its bearing on the witness's credibility and not as propensity character
evidence.8

2. Federal Rules of Evidence
When the Supreme Court enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975, it adopted the common law prohibition on propensity character
evidence as well as each of the aforementioned exceptions and
qualifications.79
i. FederalRule of Evidence 404(a)

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) continued the general proscription on
the introduction of propensity character evidence, as it stated that
"[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible
for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion., 80 Thus, Rule 404(a) deemed inadmissible "evidence of a violent
disposition to prove that the person was the aggressor in an affray, or
evidence of honesty in disproof of a charge of theft."8' Rule 404(a) has
never been amended,
and its exclusion applies equally in both civil and
82
criminal cases.

75. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
76. John A. Carr, The Admissibility of PolygraphEvidence in Court-MartialProceedings:Does
the ConstitutionMandate the Gatekeeper?,43 A.F. L. REv. 1, 22 n.126 (1997).

77. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REv.
LITIG. 129, 144-45 (1987).

78. Stanley A. Goldman, Guilt by Intuition: The Insufficiency of PriorInconsistent Statements to
Convict, 65 N.C. L. REv. 1, 7 n.36 (1986).
79. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
80. Id.
81.

FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee's note.

82. See Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 575 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The rule's exclusion of such
evidence applies to both criminal and civil cases.").
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ii. Mercy Rule
Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a)(1) and (2) maintained the common
law "mercy rule. 83 These Rules provided an exception to the general
proscription on propensity character evidence for:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same ....
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused,
or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character
trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution
in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor.84
Thus, under Rules 404(a)(1) and (2), a criminal defendant could still
prevent propensity character evidence from tainting his trial by not
presenting such evidence on his own behalf-except in homicide cases
where the prosecution could present evidence of the alleged victim's
peacefulness after the defendant presented evidence that the alleged victim
was the first aggressor, even if this evidence did not consist of character
evidence.85 However, if a criminal defendant so chose, under Rule 404(a)(1)
he could present pertinent propensity evidence concerning his good
character, which would allow the prosecution to repost with evidence of his
bad character for the same trait.86 For instance, in United States v. Green,
the prosecution presented the testimony of a police officer who claimed that
the defendant, an officer facing charges of harboring a fugitive, had a
reputation in the workplace for not being trustworthy. 87 The Fifth Circuit
later rejected the defendant's argument on appeal that this testimony was
improperly received, finding that it was proper rebuttal testimony presented
only after the defendant presented his own witnesses who testified about his
good reputation for truthfulness. 88
Also, if the defendant chose to, under Rule 404(a)(2), he could present
pertinent propensity evidence concerning the alleged victim's bad character,

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

FED.R. EVID. 404(a)(I)-(2).
Id.
See FED.R. EViD. 404(a)(2).
See FED.R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
180 F.3d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1999).
Id.

1011

HeinOnline -- 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 1011 2008-2009

thus, allowing the state to counter with evidence of the alleged victim's good
character for the same trait. 89 As under Rule 404(a)(1), however, the only
permissible method of proof in such cases was reputation and opinion
testimony, not specific act evidence. 90 The explanation for this dichotomy
can be found in Federal Rule of Evidence 405(a), which indicated then and
still indicates that "[i]n all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony [only]
as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion." 91 As an
example, in United States v. Keiser, the Ninth Circuit found that the trial
court properly permitted a defendant, who claimed that he shot the alleged
victim to defend his brother, to present reputation and opinion testimony
concerning the violent character of the alleged victim while properly
precluding him from presenting evidence that the alleged victim had
committed specific acts of violence.92
Rule 405(a), however, provides that "[o]n cross-examination, inquiry is
allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. 9 3 The purpose of this
qualification is not for the jury to use these specific instances of misconduct
as propensity character evidence. 94 The Rules merely allow for the asking of
such a question on cross-examination, while precluding the introduction of
extrinsic evidence in the event that the witness provides an unsatisfactory
answer. 9 Such questioning is allowed under the theory that the crossexaminer was probing the testimonial qualifications of the witness.96 For
example, the prosecution in a murder case might ask a witness who testified
as to defendant's reputation within the community for being non-violent,
"Have you heard that the defendant committed a murder three years ago?" 97
The effect courts want such a question to have on jurors is as follows:
If the witness has not heard of [the murder], then an implication is
created that he is not sufficiently qualified to attest to the
defendant's reputation in the community. If the witness has heard
about the specific act, and still testifies to the defendant's good
reputation in the community, then an implication is created that the

89.
90.
91.
92.

See FED.R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
See FED.R. EVID. 405(a).
Id.
57 F.3d 847, 855 (9th Cir. 1995).

93. FED. R.EVID. 405(a).
94. See id.
95. See, e.g., United Stats v. Bendetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1250 (2d Cir.
a character witness may be asked on cross-examination about 'specific
acts may not be proved by extrinsic evidence of the sort offered here.").
96. See, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 91 n.160 (D.C.
97. See generally United States v. Kinsella, 545 F. Supp. 2d 158, 162
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community itself is suspect, or that the witness is lying about the
good reputation.98
Courts did not, however, want jurors in such cases to conclude, "[o]nce
a murderer, always a murderer," and thus would typically give a limiting
instruction informing jurors that they should use the question and response
solely to evaluate the character witness's qualifications and not as propensity
character evidence. 99

And, of course, the party seeking to ask such a

question on cross-examination first had to demonstrate a good faith basis for
believing the incident at issue actually occurred.'00
The Advisory Committee noted that it was maintaining the "mercy rule"
in criminal cases because it was "so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as
to assume almost constitutional proportions and to override doubts of the
basic relevancy of the evidence."'01 The Committee also flagged the
argument that "circumstantial use of character ought to be allowed in civil
cases to the same extent as in criminal cases."' 2 It found, however, that
while the criminal/civil dichotomy had its basis "more in history and
experience than in logic an underlying justification can fairly be found in
terms of the
relative presence and absence of prejudice in the various
10 3
situations."'
As support for this proposition, the Committee relied upon an article by
Judson F. Falknor. 1°4 However, Falknor's defense of the criminal/civil
dichotomy, if it could even be called that, was equivocal to the point of
being unlikely to stand up to a stiff breeze. According to Falknor:
The only conceivable basis for the [dichotomy] is the notion that the
party has more at stake in the criminal action. But this is very thin,
since a party may have a tremendous amount at stake in a civil
action also; not only his money or property but, when charged with
criminal or immoral acts, his honor and reputation as well.0 5

98. Id. (quoting SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir. 1992)).

99. See id.
100. Id.
101. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note.
102. Id.

103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Judson F. Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTOERs L.
REv. 574 (1956)).
105. Falknor, supra note 104, at 582.
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Nonetheless, the Committee relied upon Falknor's words in 10
finding
that
6
"those espousing change have not met the burden of persuasion."
What the Advisory Committee failed to address, however, was that,
while Falknor offered a possible rationalization for maintaining the criminal
and civil dichotomy, he also found that the "mercy rule" should extend to
quasi-criminal trials. According to Falknor:
[I]f evidence of good character is able to free itself from the claim
that it comes with too much "dangerous baggage" of prejudice,
distraction from the issues, time-consumption, and hazard of
surprise when offered for the accused in a criminal action, there is
no sufficient basis upon which to keep it out in a civil action
involving a charge of criminal conduct.'17
Thus, while it was clear that the drafters intended for there to be a
criminal/civil dichotomy with regard to application of the "mercy rule"
generally, it seemed to be an open question whether they also intended to
preclude courts from allowing parties to introduce propensity character
evidence in quasi-criminal cases, as the Fourth Circuit had done in Mourikas
v. Vardianos. °8 A substantial minority of courts answered this question in
the negative.' 09
(1) Courts Extending the "Mercy Rule" To Quasi-Criminal Cases
After the Federal Rules of Evidence took effect in 1975, several courts
applied Rules 404(a)(1) and (2) to civil parties in quasi-criminal cases.
Federal courts applying the rules in this manner included the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit," 0 the Seventh Circuit,"' and the
Tenth Circuit." 2 Some states also allowed parties in certain types of quasicriminal cases to use the "mercy rule.""' 3 The Fifth Circuit's opinion in
106. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note.
107. Falknor, supra note 104, at 582-83.
108. 169 F.2d 53, 54 (4th Cir. 1948).
109. See infra notes 110-125 and accompanying text.
110. See Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 576 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Here, however, we believe that the
assault and battery with which the defendants in this suit are charged falls 'close to one of a criminal
nature."').
11. Palmquist v. Selvik, Ill F.3d 1332, 1340 (7th Cir. 1997) ("For purposes of analysis ... we
can presume that this exception could apply to an excessive force case such as this.").
112. Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1044 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Although the literal language of
the exceptions to Rule 404(a) applies only to criminal cases, we agree with the district court here
that, when the central issue involved in a civil case is in nature criminal, the defendant may invoke
the exceptions to Rule 404(a).").
113. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 40.170(2)(d) (2007) ("Evidence of the character of a party for
violent behavior offered in a civil assault and battery case when self-defense is pleaded and there is
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Crumpton v. Confederation Life Insurance Co. 114 is representative of state
and federal opinions coming to such conclusions.
In Crumpton, Vicki Crumpton was the beneficiary on an accidental
death policy which covered her father, Titus." 5 After her father died,
Crumpton brought a lawsuit against the insurer, Confederation Life6
Insurance, when it refused to pay her the proceeds of the policy."
Confederation's defense was that Titus was shot by his neighbor, Joanne
Petton, after he raped her, rendering his death non-accidental and the policy
ineffectual. 1 7 To rebut this claim, Crumpton presented several character
witnesses."'
After the jury entered a verdict in Crumpton's favor, Confederation
appealed, claiming, among other things, that the trial court erred in allowing
Crumpton to present this propensity character evidence.' 19 The Fifth Circuit
disagreed, finding that while the Rule 404(a) exceptions generally only
apply "to criminal cases, the unusual circumstances here place the case very
close to one of a criminal nature.' 20 The court found that "[t]he focus of the
civil suit on the insurance policy was the issue of rape, and the resulting trial
was in most respects similar to a criminal case for rape.'' 2' Itthus
concluded that the character evidence was admissible because "[h]ad there
been a criminal case against [Titus], evidence of his character that was
pertinent would have been admissible.' 22
The Fifth Circuit then proceeded to indicate that it did "not view the
' 23
notes of the Advisory Committee as contravening this interpretation.'
The court found: "While the Committee's notes reject[ed] the expanded use
of character evidence in civil cases, we do not view this as determinative of
the circumstances of this case, which while actually civil, in character is akin
to a criminal case.' 24 Instead, it reasoned, "[W]hen evidence would be
admissible under Rule 404(a) in a criminal case, we think that it should also
be admissible in a civil suit where the focus is on essentially criminal
evidence to support such defense.").
114. 672 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1982)
115. Id.at 1250.
116. Id. at 1250-51.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1251.
119. Id. at 1252.
120. Id. at 1253.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1253 n.7.
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aspects, and the evidence is relevant, probative, and not unduly
prejudicial.' 2 5
(2) Courts Precluding the Use of the "Mercy Rule" in Quasi-Criminal
Cases
While several courts thus allowed civil parties in quasi-criminal trials to
take advantage of Rules 404(a)(1) and (2) and present propensity character
evidence, the majority of courts found that those Rules were solely
applicable to criminal cases and per se inapplicable in civil cases.126 These
courts largely adhered to this bright line dichotomy because they felt dutybound to adhere to the plain meaning and intent behind these Rules. The
opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in SEC v. Towers Financial Corp.127 most clearly illustrates the
reasoning behind this majority line of precedent.
In Towers Financial Corp., the SEC civilly sued Mitchell Brater and
others, alleging, inter alia, that Brater made false representations in
furtherance of an elaborate Ponzi scheme. 28 In Brater's proposed pretrial
order, he listed numerous character witnesses who would testify to his good
character pursuant to Rule 404(a)(1), but the SEC moved to preclude the
admission of any character evidence in the civil action. 129 The SEC noted
that Rule 404(a)(1) allowed for the admission of propensity character
evidence "offered by an accused.' ' 130 The Commission then proceeded to
argue that there is no "accused" outside of a criminal action, making Rule
404(a)(1) inapplicable in civil actions. 3' Brater countered that the court
should apply "a more flexible definition of 'accused' that includes 3a2
defendant in a 'quasi-criminal' civil proceeding, such as SEC action.'
The district court sided with the SEC, citing definitions from Black's Law
Dictionary and Webster's New World Dictionary which defined an
"accused" as a criminal defendant.133 It thus concluded that "the plain
meaning of Rule 404(a)(1)'s language limit[ed] the exception to criminal
cases, making it unavailable in [a] civil case.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id,
See Alprin, supra note 49, at 2073.
966 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Id. at 204.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 204 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1)) (internal quotations omitted).

131. Id.
132, Id.

133. Id.
134. Id.
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Meanwhile, other courts relied upon the Advisory Committee's Note.
For instance, in Ginter v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky relied upon
the language of the Advisory Committee's Note indicating that those
advocating the application of the "mercy rule" to civil cases had not met
their burden of proof in finding that it was "beyond peradventure of doubt"
that the mercy rule was only applicable in criminal cases. 35 It is important
to note, however, that while these courts found that propensity character
evidence was generally inadmissible in civil cases, many equivocated in
dicta, suggesting that they might apply the minority rule in an appropriate
quasi-criminal case. For example, after finding the Rule 404(a) exceptions
inapplicable in the civil securities fraud suit before it, the district court in
Towers Financial Corp. acknowledged and surveyed the minority line of
cases, including Perrin v. Anderson,136 a Tenth Circuit case where the court
found that character evidence was admissible in a section 1983 wrongful
death action brought by the administratrix of the estate of a man killed by
police while they were investigating a traffic accident.137 Then, far from
rejecting this line of cases out of hand, the court hedged, meekly concluding,
"[w]hatever the validity of allowing evidence of the victim's character under
Rule 404(a)(2) in a wrongful death claim, the Court is not convinced that
[the minority rule] should extend to admission of evidence concerning the
defendant's138[wrongful] character under Rule 404(a)(1) in a civil securities
fraud suit.'
(3) 2006 Amendment
This dispute finally ended when Congress, without such equivocation,
amended Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a)(1) and 404(a)(2) in 2006.'
Amended Rule 404(a)(1) now states that:
In a criminal case, evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if
evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is

135. 576 F. Supp. 627, 630 (E.D.Ky. 1984).
136. 784 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986)
137. Towers Fin. Corp., 966 F. Supp. at 205.
138. Id.at 206.
139. See Eileen A. Scallen, Proceedingwith Caution: Making and Amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 36 Sw. U. L. REv. 601, 610 (2008) (noting that Congress amended Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(a) in 2006).
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offered by an accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence
of the same trait of character of the accused 40 offered by the
prosecution.141
Meanwhile, amended Rule 404(a)(2) now provides:
In a criminal case, and subject to the limitations imposed by Rule
412,142 evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide 1case
to
43
rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor.
These amended Rules clearly circumscribed the use of propensity
character evidence in quasi-criminal cases, limiting its use to "criminal
case[s]."' 44 The Advisory Committee's Note indicated that these Rules were
"amended to clarify that in a civil case evidence of a person's character is
never admissible to prove that the person acted in conformity with the
character trait.', 145 More specifically, the Note stated that the amendments
were made to "[resolve] the dispute in the case law over whether the
exceptions in subdivisions (a)(1) 14and
(2) permit the circumstantial use of
6
character evidence in civil cases.,
The Advisory Committee noted that propensity character evidence is
generally inadmissible at trial "because it carries serious risks of prejudice,
confusion and delay."'' 47 It indicated, however, that "[i]n criminal cases, the
so-called 'mercy rule' permits a criminal defendant to introduce evidence of
pertinent character traits of the defendant and the victim."'' 48 The Committee
found, though, that this dispensation is afforded to criminal defendants
"because the accused, whose liberty is at stake, may need 'a counterweight
against the strong investigative and prosecutorial resources of the

140. This language, allowing prosecutors to counter bad character evidence offered against the
accused with evidence of the victim's bad character for the same trait, was added in 2000. See FED.
R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendment.
141. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
142. The clause referring to Rule 412, the "rape shield" rule, was added to clarify "that evidence
otherwise admissible under Rule 404(a)(2) may nonetheless be excluded in a criminal case involving
sexual misconduct." FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
143. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
144. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note to the 2006 amendment.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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government."", 149 Put another way, the "mercy rule" exists "to allow the
criminal defendant with so much at stake and so little available in the way of
conventional proof to have special dispensation to tell the factfinder just
what sort of person he really is."' 15
iii. Rape Shield
In response to the anti-rape movement, an offshoot of the civil rights
movement of the 1960s and 1970s, states began enacting "rape shield" laws,
and the Supreme Court followed suit by creating Federal Rule of Evidence
412, the federal "rape shield" rule.' 51 As amended in 1994, Rule 412(a) now
provides, "The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal
proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in
subdivisions (b) and (c): (1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged
victim engaged in other sexual behavior. (2) Evidence offered to prove any
152
alleged victim's sexual predisposition."'
So, under Rule 412(a)(1), evidence of other sexual behavior by alleged
victims is now inadmissible to prove their propensity to consent to such
sexual relations and their likely conformity with this propensity, and thus
consent, at the time of alleged rapes or similar crimes. 153 Moreover,
evidence of the sexual predisposition of alleged victims, such as their sexual
orientation, is inadmissible for the same purpose. 5 4 Thus, for instance,
evidence that an alleged victim of homosexual rape had previously engaged
in homosexual acts is inadmissible to prove his propensity to consent to such
acts and his likely conformity with this propensity at the time of the alleged

rape. 155
Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b)(1), however, provides certain
exceptions to this rule in criminal cases. It provides that:

149. Id. (quoting CHISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER
THE RULEs, 264-65 (2d ed. 1999)).

150. Id. (quoting Richard Uviller, Evidence of Characterto Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 855 (1982)).
151. Izabelle Barraquiel Reyes, The Epidemic of Injustice in Rape Law: Mandatory Sentencing as
a PartialRemedy, 12 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 355, 361-62 (2003).
152.

FED. R. EVID. 412(a).

153. See, e.g., Ledesma v. Gov't of the Virgin Is., 159 F. Supp. 2d 863, 871 n.10 (D.V.I. 2001)
("Evidence of prior sexual activity has been ruled inadmissible where there was no logical link or
relevance between the acts shown.").
154. FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
155. See, e.g., People v. Murphy, 919 P.2d 191, 197-98 (Colo. 1996) (finding such evidence
inadmissible under Colorado's counterpart to Federal Rule of Evidence 412).
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(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if
otherwise admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the
accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical
evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the
sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent
or by the prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which15 6would violate the
constitutional rights of the defendant.
An example of a court applying the exception contained in Rule
412(b)(1)(A) can be found in United States v. Begay, where the trial court
refused to allow the defendant, who was charged with aggravated sexual
abuse, to present evidence that the eight year-old alleged victim had been
sexually assaulted on several occasions in the months preceding the crime at
issue. 7 On the defendant's appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that
the prosecutor presented evidence about the alleged victim's enlarged
hymenal opening and a vaginal abrasion; consequently, evidence of the other
sexual assaults was admissible, not to prove propensity and conformity, but
to prove that those assaults,
rather than the defendant's alleged crime, could
58
have caused her injuries.1
Under Rule 412(b)(1)(B), evidence of previous sexual acts between the
alleged victim and the defendant are admissible to prove that there are
specific reasons to believe that the alleged victim may have consented to
sexual relations with the defendant at the time of an alleged rape or sexual
assault. 5 9 Finally, Rule 412(b)(1)(C) is a catch-all exception, which allows
for the admission of an alleged victim's sexual history and predisposition for
purposes other than those covered by Rule 412(b)(1)(A) and (B) when its
exclusion would violate the Due Process or Confrontation Clause rights of a
criminal defendant. 60 The case cited by the Advisory Committee in support
of this exception involved a criminal defendant seeking to impeach his
alleged victim by showing that an extramarital affair gave her a motive to

156. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
157. 937 F.2d 515, 520-21 (10th Cir. 1991).
158. Id. at 522.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 1991) ("When consent is the
issue, however, section (b)(1)(B) permits only evidence of the defendant's past experience with the
victim.").

160. Rule 412: Sex Offense Cases; Relevance ofAlleged Victim's PastSexual Behavior or Alleged
Sexual Disposition, 12 TOURo L. REV. 457, 462-63 (1996).
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lie,16' and the exception
has since most commonly been used in
62
impeachment cases.
Meanwhile, Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b)(2) provides an exception
to the Rape Shield Rule in civil cases:
In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or
sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is
otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value
substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of
unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's
reputation is admissible
only if it has been placed in controversy by
63
the alleged victim.
The Advisory Committee Note indicated that this exception was
intended to be similar in effect to the criminal exception but that "[i]t
employs a balancing test rather than the specific exceptions stated in
subdivision (b)(1) in recognition of the difficulty of foreseeing future
developments in the law," particularly with regard to "evolving causes of
action such as claims for sexual harassment."' 64 No case, however, has
applied Rule 412(b)(2) to allow for the admission of evidence concerning an
alleged victim's sexual history or predisposition to prove a purpose not
covered by Rule 412(b)(1).
Indeed, as the Advisory Committee's Note made clear, Rule 412(b)(2)
was drafted to make it more difficult to admit evidence concerning an
alleged victim's sexual history or predisposition in civil cases than it was in
criminal cases. 165 This is because evidence satisfying a Rule 412(b)(1)
exception is admissible as long as it does not violate Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, which "tilts the balance in favor of admission"' 66 of evidence
by providing that relevant evidence may only "be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed" by concerns such as "the danger of unfair

161. FED R. EvID. 412 advisory committee's note to the 1994 amendment (citing Olden v.
Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988)).
162. See, e.g., United States v. White Buffalo, 84 F.3d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding Rule
412(b)(1)(C) did not allow for evidence of the alleged victim's sexual history for impeachment
purposes).
163. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
164. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note to the 1994 Amendment.
165. Id.
166. United States v. Rivera, 83 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1996).
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prejudice.' 67 In such cases, relevant evidence will likely be admitted
because the burden is upon the party opposing the admission of evidence to
value is substantially outweighed by
prove affirmatively that its probative
168
the danger of unfair prejudice.
Consider a hypothetical in which the prosecution charges the defendant
with rape and presents evidence that the alleged victim had scratches on her
wrists. The defendant might seek, pursuant to Rule 412(b)(1)(A), to present
evidence of the alleged victim's other sexual acts committed in the days
before and after the alleged rape to prove that they could have caused her
injuries. For the judge to exclude this evidence, the prosecutor would need
to prove affirmatively that its probative value for establishing that these
other acts could have caused her injuries was substantially outweighed by
the danger that the jury would misuse this evidence as an indication that the
alleged victim had a propensity to consent to sexual acts and thus
69 likely
consented to the sexual act at issue-its unfairly prejudicial effect.
In contrast, by stating that similar evidence offered in civil cases is
admissible only if its probative value substantially outweighs its unfairly
prejudicial effect, as well as "harm to any victim," Rule 412(b)(2) "reverses
the usual approach" 7 ° and tilts the balance toward inadmissibility in three
regards. 71 First, it "raises the threshold for admission by requiring that the
probative value of the evidence substantially outweigh the specified
dangers."' 172 Second, it "shift[s] the burden to the proponent to demonstrate
admissibility rather than making the opponent justify exclusion of the
"harm to the victim" "on the scale in addition to
evidence."' 173 Third, it puts
174
prejudice to the parties."'
Thus, if we tweak the facts of the above hypothetical to make it a civil
rape trial, it drastically alters the issue of admissibility. Now, for the judge
to admit the "other sexual act" evidence, defense counsel would need to
prove affirmatively that its probative value substantially outweighs (1) the
danger that the jury could misuse this evidence as an indication that the
alleged victim had a propensity to consent to sexual acts and thus likely
consented to the sexual act at issue (its unfairly prejudicial effect); as well as
(2) the harm to the victim, including the invasion of her privacy, her

167. FED. R. EVID. 403.

168. United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 164 (lstCir. 2004).
169. See Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs' Sexual Pasts: Coping with Preconceptions Through
Discretion, 51 EMORY L.J. 559, 570-82 (2002).

170.
171.
1227,
172.
173.
174.

Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 856 (1st Cir. 1998).
Chris William Sanchirico, CharacterEvidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1295 n.164 (2001).
FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note to the 1994 Amendment (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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potential embarrassment, and the potential
for the jury to engage in
175
stereotypical thinking with regard to her.
Federal Rule of Evidence 412(c) contains procedures for providing
notice and determining the admissibility of evidence offered in criminal
cases pursuant to Rules 412(b)(1)(A)(B) or (C). 176 The purpose of this Rule
is to give notice to the opposing party in a criminal case to a similar degree
as the notice that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 affords to civil litigants
as part of the discovery process.177
iv. Sex Crime PropensityEvidence
In 1994, Congress added three new sex crime-related rules of evidence
as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.178
This Act created Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415.79 Federal Rule of
Evidence 413 states that in a criminal case in which the defendant is accused
of an offense of sexual assault, evidence that he committed other offenses of
sexual assault is admissible "and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant."'1 80 Federal Rule of Evidence 414 does the
same in cases in which the defendant in a criminal case is accused of an
offense of child molestation, allowing for the admission of evidence that he
committed other offenses of child molestation.18 ' Meanwhile, Federal Rule
of Evidence 415 achieves the same result in civil cases allowing for
evidence of a party's commission of other offenses of sexual assault and
child molestation when the opposing party's claim for damages or relief is
predicated on the party's "alleged commission of conduct constituting an
offense of sexual assault or child molestation," respectively.' 82
Congress enacted these Rules with the belief that they were "critical to
the protection of the public from rapists and child molesters,
and.., justified by the distinctive characteristics of the cases [they would]

175. Id. The Rule also indicates that "[e]vidence of an alleged victim's reputation is admissible
only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim," a restriction on admissibility not
contained in the criminal exceptions. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
176. FED. R. EVID. 412(c).

177. See John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
2097, 2142 n.194 (2000).
178. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
120005(a), 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
179. Id.
180. FED. R. EVID. 413(a).
181. FED.R.EVD.414.
182. FED. R. EVID. 415.
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'
affect."183
And while they have borne the brunt of much scholarly
criticism,' 84 all three Rules remain in effect today, ensuring that this type of
evidence is equally admissible in both civil and
propensity character
185
cases.
criminal

v.

Character "In Issue"

Federal Rule of Evidence 405(b) retained the common law qualification
allowing for the admission of character evidence when character was
'
deemed "inissue."186
It stated that "[iln cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense,
' 87
proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct."'
Courts narrowly construed Rule 405(b) and found that it was "limited to
issues such as defamation, negligent hiring or entrustment, determining the
hearing, and possibly entrapment
best interests of a child in a child custody
188
when raised as a criminal defense."'
So, for instance, in Longmire v. Alabama State University, the court

dealt with, inter alia, a counterclaim by Dr. Leon Howard, who alleged that
his former employee, Venus Longmire, "defamed him by accusing him of
having attempted to rape her."' 89 Longmire argued that based upon this
counterclaim, she should have been allowed to present evidence relating to
Dr. Howard's past sexual activities, including an alleged extra-marital
affair. 190 The United States District Court of the Middle District of Alabama
agreed, finding that "[b]ecause Dr. Howard ha[d] placed his character 'in
issue' by filing a defamation action, his good or bad character may be
proven by specific instances of his conduct."' 9' This evidence, however,
could not be used to prove that Dr. Howard had a propensity to engage in
certain types of sexual acts and that he thus likely acted in conformity with
this propensity at the time in question.' 92 Instead, it was offered to prove
that Dr. Howard already had a bad reputation for sexual misconduct,

183. 140 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement ofRep. Molinari).
184. See, e.g., Rosanna Cavallaro, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Struggle for
Rulemaking Preeminence, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31 (2007).
185. Compare FED. R. EVID. 413-14 (allowing propensity character evidence in criminal cases),
with FED. R. EVID. 415 (allowing propensity character evidence in civil cases).
186.
187.

FED. R. EVID. 405(b).
Id.

188. James A. Adams, Admissibility of Proofof an Assault Victim's Specific Instances of Conduct
as an Essential Element of a Self-Defense Claim Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 405, 39 DRAKE L.
REv. 401,415 (1989-1990).
189. 151 F.R.D 414, 416 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
190. Id. at 419.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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meaning that Longmire either was not liable for defamation or that any
damages against her should be minimal.' 93
Rule 405(b)94 has never been amended and applies equally in civil and
criminal cases.1
vi. Other Purposes
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) continued to allow for the admission of
character evidence to prove certain purposes other than propensity and
conformity. Under Rule 404(b), while evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts was not admissible as propensity character evidence, it was "admissible
preparation,
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
195
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."'
(1) Permissible "Other Purposes"
Thus, Rule 404(b) was consistent with the common law cases finding
"other act evidence" admissible to prove motive,' 96 intent or absence of
mistake or accident, 97 common scheme, plan, modus operandi, signature
crime, 198 and identity. 99 Rule 404(b) also added other permissible purposes:
opportunity or ability, preparation, and knowledge.200 Additionally, courts
have found that Rule 404(b)'s list of permissible purposes is non-exhaustive

193. Id.
194. See Miguel A. Mrndez, VII. Relevance: Definition and Limitations--Conforming the
California Evidence Code to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 329, 343 (2007)
("Whenever a character trait is an element of a criminal or civil cause of action, Rule 405(b) and
Code section 1101 allow the use of relevant evidence to prove the trait.").
195.

FED. R. EVID. 404(b).

196. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 731 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding evidence that
the defendant was apprehended with drugs was admissible to prove his motive to kidnap a rival drug
dealer).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Hum, 496 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that the
defendant's prior conviction for cocaine distribution was admissible to prove intent in his
prosecution for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 54-56 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding evidence that
the defendant had previously constructed a remote-controlled bomb was admissible to prove modus
operandi in his trial for constructing a similar bomb that killed one Boston police officer and
severely injured another).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 170 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Gibson's statements to
the FBI ...helped establish that Agent Banks dealt with Gibson, not his brother, in the charged 1996
drug transactions even though Gibson did not confess to the specific undercover sales in this case.").
200. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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and that character evidence can also be used for other purposes, such as
rebutting a duress defense. °1
As in the common law cases, courts in post-Rule 404(b) cases continued
to balance probative value and prejudicial effect even after determining that
character evidence was relevant to prove some permissible purpose, with the
balancing test being "the same for both criminal and civil cases. 20 2 Rule
404(b) also continued to allow the party against whom such character
evidence was offered to ask for and receive a limiting instruction informing
the jury that the evidence was to be considered solely as evidence of a
permissible purpose, such as intent, and not as propensity character
evidence.2 °3
(2) 1991 Amendment
Only one change has been made to Rule 404(b) since its introduction,
the addition of a clause at the end of its second sentence. As amended in
1991, the Rule now provides in relevant part that "other act" evidence is
admissible for:
[O]ther purposes.., provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on
good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial.2°
The Committee clearly articulated, however, that the amendment was
not "intended to redefine what evidence would otherwise be admissible
under Rule 404(b). 2 °5 Instead, as with the aforementioned Rule 412(c), the
purpose of this Rule is to give notice to the opposing party in a criminal case
to a similar degree as the notice that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26
affords to civil litigants as part of the discovery process. 206

201. See, e.g., United States v. Verduzco, 373 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004).
202. Marc T. Treadwell, Survey Articles: Evidence, 49 MERCER L. REv. 1027, 1035 (1997-1998).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Gaddy, 532 F.3d 783, 789-90 (8th Cir. 2008).
204.

FED. R. EVID. 404(b).

205. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note.
206. See Douglass, supra note 177, at 2142 n. 194.
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vii. Impeachment

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(3) continued to allow for impeachment
by permitting the admission of "[e]vidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609," the Rules governing impeachment. °7
(1) Rule 607
Federal Rule of Evidence 607 eliminated the common law "voucher
rule" by stating that "[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling the witness. 11208A The Advisory
Committee's Note accompanying the Rule indicated that the voucher rule
was based upon "false premises" because "[a] party does not hold out his
witnesses as worthy of belief, since he rarely has a free choice in selecting
them., 20 9 Rule 607 has never been amended and applies equally to criminal
and civil cases.210
(2) Rule 608
While Rule 607 thus dismantled the "voucher rule," Federal Rule of
Evidence 608 retained the remainder of the common law rules regarding
impeachment of witnesses through opinion and reputation evidence
concerning honesty and veracity. Under Rule 608(a), parties could impeach
witnesses through opinion and reputation evidence and could still only
bolster the credibility of a witness after his or her character for truthfulness
was attacked. 21 ' As in the Rule 404(b) context, the party against whom such
impeachment evidence was offered could ask for and receive a limiting
instruction informing the jury that the evidence was to be considered solely
as evidence bearing upon his credibility as a witness and not as propensity
character evidence.1 2 Additionally, as under Rule 405(a), Federal Rule of
Evidence 608(b) only allowed parties to inquire into specific instances of
dishonesty on cross-examination to gauge the testimonial qualifications of
the witness, with such inquiry requiring a good faith belief that the instances
207. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3).
208. FED. R. EVID. 607.
209. FED. R. EVID. 607 advisory committee's note.
210. See Thomas Black, Article VI: Witnesses, 30 HoUs. L. REv. 673, 717 (1993) (noting that the
Texas counterpart to Federal Rule of Evidence 607 is identical to it and applies in both civil and
criminal cases).
211. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 728 F.2d 864, 873 (7th Cir. 1984).
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occurred and without resort to extrinsic evidence in the event of an
unsatisfactory answer. 13 Besides a clarifying amendment in 2003,1 Rule
608 has
not been amended, and it applies equally in both criminal and civil
215
cases.

III. RULE 609(a)(1) IMPEACHMENT
A.

Disqualificationfor Infamy and the Common Law Originsof
Conviction-BasedImpeachment

In the common law days, the doctrine of disqualification for infamy
deemed an individual who had been convicted of a felony or a crime of
crimenfalsi incompetent to testify at trial.21 6 At the time, felony convictions

were generally defined as convictions for crimes punishable by incarceration
for more than one year 2"7 while "[c]rimen falsi referred to crimes of fraud

and deceit, as well as crimes that generally fell under the category of
obstruction of justice. ' '218 The "infamy rule" was part of a patchwork of
rules deeming certain categories of individuals incompetent to testify at
trial. 21 9 For instance, spouses were incompetent to testify under the doctrine

of coverture and atheists were incompetent to testify on the grounds of
irreligion. 220 Eventually, statutory reforms replaced these incompetence
rules. 12 1 One such reform replaced the doctrine of disqualification for
infamy with a rule permitting convicted individuals to testify, but allowing
for the automatic admission of evidence of their felony and crimen falsi
convictions for impeachment purposes.222 Subsequently, most courts
relented in the face of scholarly criticism of such automatic admission and
shifted "toward a more flexible approach" under which they balanced a

213. FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
214. See FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee's note to the 2003 amendment ("The Rule has
been amended to clarify that the absolute prohibition on extrinsic evidence applies only when the
sole reason for proffering that evidence is to attack or support the wimess'[s] character for
truthfulness.").
215. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of Impeaching the
Nontestifying Declarant, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 495, 519 n.80 (1995) ("Impeachment pursuant to Rule
608 is permissible in both civil and criminal cases.").
216. See Roger C. Park, Impeachment with Evidence of PriorConvictions, 36 Sw. U. L. RaV. 793,
793 (2008) ("The usual list of disqualifying crimes included all felonies and all crimes of 'crimen
falsi."').
217. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, The CriminalProcedureRoad Not Taken: Due Process and
the ProtectionofInnocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 169, 183 (2005).
218. Park, supra note 216, at 793.
219. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1369 n.35 (1985).
220. Id.
221. Park, supra note 216, at 793-94.
222. Id.
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conviction's probative value against its prejudicial effect before admitting
it.223

B. FederalRule ofEvidence 609-The JudicialScylla
Congress eventually codified this common law into Federal Rule of
Evidence 609, which was "[s]ewn together using disparate parts and
contradictory theories. 224 Those who wanted convictions deemed per se
admissible to impeach witnesses were pitted against those who urged that
strict limits be placed on conviction-based impeachment, with each and
every opinion in between finding voice in one of the panoply of its drafts. 25
Rule 609 sparked more controversy than any other provision of the Federal
Rules of Evidence by a significant margin, with the debate so fierce that it
eventually "threatened the entire project to create a Federal Rules of
Evidence" as the debate exploded from a narrow discussion of impeachment
into a broad referendum "on how to balance the rights of an accused against
the rights of society to defend itself from criminals. 226 And the bulk of that
debate centered around Rule 609(a), with its discussion consuming nine
pages of the Congressional record compared to the five page consideration
of the entirety of Article Eight, which encompassed "highly controversial
changes to traditional hearsay doctrine. ' 227 As finally enacted, Rule 609 was
thus a "creature born of legislative compromise", 22 -a judicial Scylla of
sorts-"incorporating no less than three balancing tests, two references to
fairness, one to justice, and several other undefined terms" 229 which
"wreak[ed] a sort of judicial vengeance on those unfortunate enough to have
230
to apply it."

223. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 512-13 (1989).
224. Mark Voigtmann, Note, The Short History of a Rule of Evidence That Failed (FederalRule
of Evidence 609, Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. and the New Amendment), 23 IND. L. REV.
927, 929 (1990).
225. Irving Younger, Three Essays on Characterand Credibility Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 7, 11 (1976).
226. Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: JudicialDiscretion and the Politics of
Rule 609, 15 CARDoZO L. REV. 2295, 2295, 2301 (1994).
227. Id. at 2303 n.45.
228. Voigtmann, supra note 224, at 929.
229. Gold, supra note 226, at 2296.
230. Voigtmann, supranote 224, at 929.
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C. Structureof Rule 609. Navigatingthe Jabberwocky

1. Rule 609(a)
When a party attempted to impeach a witness or testifying party through
evidence of a conviction, courts had to begin their inquiry under Rule
609(a), which indicated that, "[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of
a witness ... evidence that a witness other than the accused has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted" if elicited from the witness or
established by public record during cross-examination, but only "if the crime
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law under which the witness was convicted, and.., the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the accused," or if the crime
"involved dishonesty or false
23
statement, regardless of the punishment., '
There were thus several requirements a party had to satisfy before it
could impeach a witness through evidence of a conviction. The first was
that the impeachment could only be done "during cross-examination,"
meaning that a party could not impeach its own witness.232

This was a

limitation, however, which "virtually every circuit found to be
inapplicable. 233 Instead, it soon became common practice for courts to
allow attorneys to reveal their witness's convictions during direct
examination "to 'remove the sting' of the impeachment. '234 Second, a party
could only establish that a witness had an impeachable conviction through
the public record or the witness's admission.235 Many courts, however,
similarly ignored this requirement and allowed parties to prove convictions
through other methods, such as "rap sheets., 236 Third, the conviction at
issue either had to be a conviction for a crime involving dishonesty or false
statement or a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year-the Congressional definition of a felony conviction. 237 The next two
subsections briefly address this last requirement.
2. Rule 609(a)(1): Felony Conviction Impeachment
Under Rule 609(a)(1), parties could impeach witnesses and testifying
parties through felony convictions for any type of crime. 238 As the language
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's notes to the 1990 amendment.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
United States v. Scott, 592 F.2d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 1979).
FED. R. EVID. 609; see FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
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of the rule indicated, in determining whether a conviction was a felony
conviction, courts were to consider whether the crime for which the witness
was convicted was punishable, and not whether it was actually punished, by
imprisonment in excess of one year or death.23 9 Thus, for instance, in United
States v. Harris, the Ninth Circuit found that Rule 609(a)(1) applied to a
testifying defendant's conviction for cocaine possession, which was
punishable in California by incarceration for up to three years, despite the
fact that the defendant was only sentenced to probation with 270 days in
jail. 240 Assuming that a court found that a witness indeed had a felony
conviction, Rule 609(a)(l) laid out a balancing test, but, in one of the Rule's
bag of tricks, courts were not to apply it until after considering Rules 609(c),
609(b), and 609(d).24
3.

Rule 609(a)(2): Crimen Falsi Impeachment

Meanwhile, under Rule 609(a)(2), parties could impeach witnesses and
testifying parties through evidence of convictions for crimes of "dishonesty
or false statement," meaning that convictions falling under its auspices could
be of either the felony or misdemeanor variety.242 But what convictions fell
under its auspices? The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 609 made clear
that the Committee intended Rule 609(a)(2) to cover convictions for the
same crimes deemed crimen falsi under the common law.243 Specifically,
the Committee stated that the phrase "dishonesty or false statement" was
meant to cover "crimes such as perjury, or subordination of perjury, false
statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other
offense in the nature of crimen falsi, commission of which involves some
element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused's
propensity to testify truthfully."'244 Assuming that a court found that a
witness indeed had a conviction for a crimen falsi crime, Rule 609(a)(2)
provided that the conviction was per se admissible for impeachment
purposes in either a criminal or civil case, 245 but, again, only after
consideration of Rules 609(c), 609(b), and 609(d).

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
1992 WL 72868, No. 90-50658 at *2 n.2 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 1992).
See id.
United States v. Mahone, 328 F. Supp. 2d 77, 82 (D. Me. 2004).
FED. R. EvID. 609 advisory committee's note.
Id.
FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(2).
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4.

609(c): Pardon the Interruption

Rule 609(c) set forth two situations where a witness's convictions were
per se inadmissible to impeach his testimony. First, under Rule 609(c)(1), a
party could not impeach a witness through a conviction if:
[T]he conviction ha[d] been the subject of a pardon, annulment,
certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on
a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that
person ha[d] not been convicted of a subsequent crime which
was
24 6
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year.
Second, pursuant to Rule 609(c)(2), a party could not impeach a witness
through a conviction if "the conviction ha[d] been the subject of a pardon,
annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of
innocence.'247
The Rule thus enumerated a few procedures which potentially triggered
a Rule 609(c) analysis. One enumerated procedure was the pardon, in which
the President, governor, or an agency such as a pardon or parole board
releases an offender from the consequences of his offense.248 In such a
situation, the pardoner delivers the pardon to the pardonee, and the pardon is
"not communicated officially to the court., 249 Conversely, a convict
typically receives an annulment from a court by filing a petition of
annulment with the sentencing court pursuant to a procedure set forth in a
statute.
Meanwhile, the "'certificate of rehabilitation,' is something
similar to an annulment or a pardon, constituting an exceptional
' 25
determination that the defendant has been fully reintegrated into society. ,
A pardon or annulment can be based on a finding of innocence. For
instance, one study found that between 1989 and 2003, there were forty-two
cases where executive officers issued pardons based upon evidence of
defendants' innocence, which often consisted of DNA evidence. 252 Because
the exonerated individuals in such cases were deemed innocent of the
subject crimes, their convictions could not be used to impeach them, even if
they were subsequently convicted of other crimes 3

246. FED. R. EviD. 609(c)(1).
247.

FED. R. EVID. 609(c)(2).

248. Osbom v. United States, 91 U.S. 474,477 (1875).
249. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150,161 (1833).
250. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. § 651:5 (setting forth the procedure under which certain convicts
can file apetition of annulment with the sentencing court).
251. United States v. Berger, No. 94-30128, 1995 WL 110097 at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995).
252. Samuel R. Gross, Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005).
253. FED. R. EviD. 609(c) advisory committee's note.
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Like the certificate of rehabilitation, pardons and annulments can also be
based upon a finding that the convicted person was rehabilitated. As an
example, in Brown v. Frey, the plaintiff John Brown, an inmate at the
Missouri Eastern Correctional Center (MECC), brought a lawsuit alleging
that various MECC employees deprived him of numerous constitutional
rights. 25 4 At trial, the district court precluded Brown from cross-examining
MECC Investigator Captain Ron Kennedy regarding a prior perjury
conviction. 2 11 Upon Brown's cross-appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that the
district court properly precluded such cross-examination, noting that Captain
Kennedy's conviction was pardoned based on a finding of rehabilitation.2 56
The Eighth Circuit thus concluded that the district court properly precluded
cross-examination because Rule 609(c)(1) provided "without enumerated
when the
exception[,] that the evidence of conviction is not admissible
257
witness has received a pardon based upon rehabilitation.,
Despite the Eighth Circuit's claim that Rule 609(c)(1) was "without
enumerated exception," there was indeed a stated exception when the
witness to be impeached had been "convicted of a subsequent crime which
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year., 258 The
reasoning behind this exception was that Rule 609(c)(1) prevented
impeachment on the ground "that a rehabilitated person should no longer be
associated with his conviction. 259 When, however, a witness was
"subsequently convicted of a felony, he ... demonstrated that he [wa]s not
truly rehabilitated., 260 The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia used this qualification in United States v. Morrow, when it
allowed defense counsel to impeach a witness for the prosecution through a
felony weapons conviction, which had been set aside due to rehabilitation
2 61
because the witness was subsequently convicted of felony theft.
By its language, Rule 609(c) also precluded conviction-based
impeachment when the conviction was subjected to an "equivalent
procedure," with the dispositive question being whether the procedure was
based upon a finding of rehabilitation or innocence of the person

254. 889 F.2d 159, 161 (8th Cir. 1989).
255. Id. at 162.
256. Id. at 171.
257. Id.
258. FED. R. EviD. 609(c)(1).
259. Chandra S. Menon, Comment, Impeaching Witnesses in Criminal Cases with Evidence of
Convictions: PuttingLouisiana'sRule in Context, 79 TuL. L. REV. 701, 709 (2005).
260. Id.
261. 2005 WL 1017827, No. CRIM.A. 04-355(CKK) at *2 (D.D.C. May 2,2005).
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convicted.262 An example where a court found this question answered in the
affirmative can be found in United States v. Pagan, where the Second
Circuit determined that the district court committed reversible error by
allowing the prosecution to impeach the defendant through his conviction
for interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle because that conviction was
vacated pursuant to the set-aside provision of an act which required a finding
that the offender's rehabilitation had been accomplished.263 Conversely, in
U.S. Xpress Enterprises, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., a district court

denied the motion of a co-defendant to preclude the plaintiff from
impeaching its driver through convictions under Canadian law for
pel the Eighth
possession of stolen property and conspiracy. 264 O
On appeal,
Circuit found that the district court's decision was not an abuse of discretion
because the driver's convictions were absolved under Canadian law, not
based upon a finding of innocence or rehabilitation, but because the driver
paid $5,000 and complied with his six-month probation term.265
Of course, pardons or annulments can also be issued without a finding
of innocence or rehabilitation, as is the case with automatic pardons issued
to restore the civil rights lost by an incarcerated individual by virtue of his
conviction.266 Moreover, when a conviction was pardoned, annulled, or
otherwise expunged based upon a desire to encourage rehabilitation, as
opposed to a finding of rehabilitation, Rule 609(c) did not preclude
impeachment.267
Nonetheless, a few courts flatly rejected Rule 609(c) and refused to
require a finding of innocence or rehabilitation. For instance, in United
States v. Hamilton, criminal defendants sought to use a conviction to
impeach a witness for the prosecution who had been pardoned by the
governor, but not based upon a finding of innocence or rehabilitation.26 8
Despite the language of Rule 609(c), the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas precluded such impeachment, finding that "a
pardon is a pardon" and that "[t]he
federal evidentiary rule and supporting
269
case law are logically deficient.

262. United States v. Wood, 943 F.2d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 1991).
263. 721 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1983).
264. 320 F.3d 809, 816 (8th Cir. 2003).
265. Id.
266. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note ("A pardon or its equivalent granted solely for
the purpose of restoring civil rights lost by virtue of a conviction has no relevance to an inquiry into
character.").
267. Wood, 943 F.2d at 1055 ("Rehabilitory motivation alone, however, is insufficient to trigger
Rule 609(c).").
268. 827 F. Supp. 424, 424 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
269. Id. at 425.
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Rule 609(c) has never been amended, and it applies equally in both
criminal and civil cases. 70
5.

609(b): Ten Years Have Got Behind You

If a felony or crimen falsi conviction was not the subject of a Rule
609(c) procedure, but if it was more than ten years old, Rule 609(b)
prescribed a balancing test that would replace Rule 609(a)(1)'s balancing
test or the per se admissibility laid out in Rule 609(a)(2). 271 Rule 609(b)
stated in relevant part that:
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period
of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction
or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for
that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts2 72 and circumstances
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
As Rule 609(b) indicated, the ten year clock began with the date of the
prior conviction or the date of release, whichever was later.2 73 So, if a
witness was convicted of a crime more than ten years before trial but was
not released from confinement for that crime until ten years or less before
trial, Rule 609(b) would not cover the conviction, with the date of release
being the "determinative date. 274 Conversely, if a witness was convicted of
a crime and sentenced to time served or not sentenced to incarceration, the
date of conviction was the determinative date.275
As under Rule 412(b)(2)-the rape shield exception for civil caseswhen convictions were more than ten years old, Rule 609(b) provided a
balancing test that flipped Rule 403 on its head and required that the
proponent establish that the conviction's probative value substantially
270. Compare Brown v. Frey, 889 F.2d 159, 161 (8th Cir. 1989) (precluding the use of a pardoned
conviction for impeachment purposes in a civil case), with United States v. Pagan, 721 F.2d 24, 30
(2d Cir. 1983) (precluding the use of a set-aside conviction for impeachment purposes in a criminal
case).
271.

FED. R. EVID. 609(b).

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 52 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
275. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1033 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[B]ecause Lopez
was given probation and was not confined, the date of the conviction controls.").
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outweighed its prejudicial effect.276

The Advisory Committee Note

indicated that Rule 609(b) tipped the scales in favor of inadmissibility
because "convictions over ten years old generally do not have much
probative value.

277

Nonetheless, Rule 609(b) left the door open for the

admission of some remote convictions for impeachment purposes because
there "may be exceptional circumstances under which the conviction
substantially bears on the credibility of the witness., 278 The Rule, however,
only left the door open a crack, with the Advisory Committee indicating that
its intention was for remote convictions to "be admitted very rarely and only
in exceptional circumstances. 279
Some courts, however, ignored the language of Rule 609(b) and allowed
for the admission of convictions falling under its auspices without finding
280
that their probative value substantially outweighed their prejudicial effect.
been amended, and it applies equally in both criminal
Rule 609(b) has28 never
1
and civil cases.
6. 609(d): Youthful Indiscretions
Finally, if the "conviction" at issue was in fact a juvenile adjudication,
courts had to apply Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d), which stated that:
Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under
this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence
of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the
credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in
evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence.282

The upshot of Rule 609(d) was that, for impeachment purposes,
283
evidence of juvenile adjudications was per se inadmissible in civil cases

276. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
277. FED. R. EVID. 609(b) advisory committee's note.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 592 F.2d 1139 (10th Cir. 1979).
281. See Thomas J. Reed, The Re-Birth of the Delaware Rules of Evidence: A Summary of the
2002 Changes in the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence, 5 DEL. L. REV. 155, 186 n.65 (2002)
(noting that Delaware's counterpart to Fed. R. Evid. 609(d) applies equally in civil and criminal
trials).
282. FED. R. EVID. 609(d).

283. See Powell v. Levit, 640 F.2d 239, 241 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The trial court has no discretion to
admit such evidence in a civil proceeding.").
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and per se inadmissible when offered against a criminal defendant.284 Some
of the main rationales undergirding this disfavoring of impeachment through
juvenile adjudications were "policy considerations much akin to those which
dictate exclusion of adult convictions after rehabilitation has been
established., 285 Indeed, before the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
"It]he prevailing view ha[d] been that a juvenile adjudication [wa]s not
usable for impeachment., 286 The drafters of Rule 609(d) decided to take a
different route by not categorically excluding the use of juvenile
adjudications in criminal cases to impeach witnesses other than defendants.
The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 609 indicated that this deviation
was premised on the grounds that "the rehabilitative process may in a given
case be a demonstrated failure, or the strategic importance of a given witness
may be so great as to require the overriding of general policy in the interests
of particular justice. 287
As support for this contention, the Advisory Committee cited to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Giles v. Maryland.288

In Giles, two brothers

convicted of raping a sixteen year-old girl filed a petition for post-conviction
relief, which claimed, inter alia, that the prosecution denied them due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by suppressing evidence
favorable to them, including evidence about the results of two juvenile court
proceedings against the alleged victim. 289 The case eventually reached the
Supreme Court, which found that the prosecutor's failure to disclose
material facts to the defense violated their right to a fair trial under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.290
This Supreme Court case underpinning Rule 609(d)'s deviation from the
prevailing view implied that the Rule was intended to allow only criminal
defendants to impeach witnesses in cases where holding otherwise would
violate their constitutional rights. 291 Notwithstanding this fact, the broad
language of Rule 609(d) ostensibly allowed both criminal defendants and the
prosecution to use juvenile adjudications to impeach.292 The rule clearly

284. See United States v. Pretlow, 770 F. Supp. 239, 243 (D.N.J. 1991) ("Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(d) simply does not permit the use of such evidence against a [criminal] defendant.").
285. FED. R. EVID. 609(d) advisory committee's note.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
289. Id. at 69.
290. Id.
291. See id.
292. See FED. R. EVID. 609(d).
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allowed for impeachment through evidence of juvenile adjudications when
such impeachment was "necessary for a fair determination of the issue of
guilt or innocence."'2 93 In other words, when impeachment through juvenile
adjudications was necessary for a defendant to prove that he was innocent,
he could use Rule 609(d) to impeach; when such impeachment was
necessary to prove that the defendant was guilty, the prosecution could use
Rule 609(d) to impeach. M
When, however, was such impeachment "necessary for a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence?, 295 In making this
determination, courts considered factors such as whether the "juvenile court
adjudication could shed light on the credibility of a key witness," and
"whether in the particular case the rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile
system ha[d] failed., 296 Only if the party seeking to impeach a witness
through a juvenile adjudication could make a strong showing on these
factors could he overcome the "presumption that evidence of juvenile
adjudications is generally not admissible. 297
Even upon making such a showing, however, a party still needed to
prove under Rule 609(d) that an adult conviction for the same offense
leading to the juvenile adjudication would have been "admissible to attack
the credibility of an adult., 298 Therefore, if the analysis reached this stage of
Rule 609(d) (which has never been amended) the court had to default back
to Rule 609(a) to determine whether the offense underlying the juvenile
adjudication was a crime of dishonesty or false statement or a crime
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year.299
Only at this point, or if none of Rules 609(b), 609(c), and 609(d)
applied, would courts (1) per se permit impeachment of witnesses through
evidence of convictions for crimes of dishonesty or false statement under
Rule 609(a)(2), or (2) apply Rule 609(a)(1) when parties sought to impeach
witnesses through evidence of felony convictions. This takes us back to our
consideration of Rule 609(a)(1).

293. Id. (emphasis added).
294. See, e.g., Col. Francis A. Gilligan, Credibility of Witnesses Under the Military Rules of
Evidence, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 595, 608 (1985) ("Since Rule 609(d) also allows the judge to permit
impeachment of a defense witness, Davis v. Alaska acts as a two-way street.").
295. FED R. EvID. 609(d).
296. John E.B. Myers, The Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination, CrossExamination, and Impeachment, 18 PAC. L.J. 801,932 (1987).
297. United States v. Williams, 963 F.2d 1337, 1341 (10th Cir. 1992).
298. FED. R. EvID. 609(d).
299. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
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7.

609(a)(1) Revisited

As noted, Rule 609(a)(1) permitted impeachment through evidence of a
felony conviction, but only "if the court determine[d] that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweigh[ed] its prejudicial effect to the
[defendant] .300

8. Criminal Defendants
There was only one scenario in which courts read this "special balancing
test" in roughly the same manner: the scenario in which the prosecution
sought to impeach a testifying criminal defendant. In this scenario, courts
always gave criminal defendants the benefit of this test, typically
considering five factors in their analyses. These factors, which were first
articulated by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Mahone, consisted of(1) The impeachment value of the prior crime.
(2) The point in time of the conviction and the witness' [s]
subsequent history.
(3) The similarity between the past crime and the charged crime.
(4) The importance of the defendant's testimony.
(5) The centrality of the credibility issue. °1
Meanwhile, a minority of courts phrased this five factor test as a four
factor test, with the third factor analyzed as part of the first factor. These
courts considered:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

the kind of crime involved
when the conviction occurred
the importance of the witness's testimony to the case
the importance of the credibility of the defendant.3 °2

Under the first factor of both tests, courts considered how much bearing
the crime underlying the prior conviction had on the issue of the defendant's
honesty and veracity; "the greater the impeachment value, the higher the

300.
301.
States,
302.

FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(1).
United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976) (construing Gordon v. United
383 F.2d 936, 940 (1967)).
United States v. D'Agata, 646 F. Supp. 390, 391 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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probative value. 3 °3 Courts found that crimes of violence have low
probative value because such crimes "have little or no direct bearing on
honesty" and are instead thought to result "from a short temper, a combative
nature, extreme provocation, or other causes. 3 4 While possession of a
controlled substance was thought to have little necessary bearing on
veracity, 305 "[p]rior drug-trafficking crimes [we]re generally viewed as
having some bearing on veracity. 30 6 Meanwhile, courts determined that
have a definite bearing on honesty which is
"[b]urglary and petit larceny 307
directly related to credibility.
Under the second factor of both tests, "convictions ha[d] more probative
value as they bec[a]me more recent; 3 a0 8 "the older the conviction, the less
probative it [wa]s on the credibility issue."30 9 The theory behind this sliding
scale approach was that the further a defendant was removed from a
conviction, the more likely it became that he was rehabilitated, meaning that
the conviction now told the court less about his current honesty. 310 Under
the second factor, courts also considered the defendant's subsequent
history.311 When a defendant had "continued conflict with the law," as
demonstrated by subsequent convictions, his behavior demonstrated that he
rehabilitated, increasing the probative value of his older
was not truly
3 12
convictions.
Under the third factor of the majority test, which courts applying the
four factor test analyzed as part of the first factor,313 the similarity between
the crime underlying the defendant's previous conviction and the crime with
which he was charged was directly related to the conviction's prejudicial
effect: The more similar the two crimes, the more prejudicial the prior
conviction; the less similar, the less prejudicial.31 4 While this relationship
may at first appear counterintuitive, it made sense because, again, the
conviction was being used solely for its bearing on the credibility of the
defendant's testimony and not being used as propensity character evidence,

303. Id. (discussing the Mahone court's analysis of the first factor).
304.

United States v. Cueto, 506 F. Supp. 9, 13 (W.D. Okla 1979).

305. United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1971).
306. United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2005).
307.

United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1029 (1st Cir. 1979).

308. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir. 1977).
309. United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1194 (9th Cir. 1979).
310. United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
311. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
312. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. at 53 ("The Court is of the opinion that that the defendant's continued
conflict with the law, even while on parole, is a factor supporting admission of the convictions for

impeachment purposes.").
313.

United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2007) (analyzing similarity under the

first factor of the four factor test).
314. United States v. D'Agata, 646 F. Supp. 390, 391 (E.D. Pa 1986).

1040

HeinOnline -- 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 1040 2008-2009

Impeachable Offenses?

[Vol. 36: 997, 2009]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

which was precluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404.3" Because the
"[a]dmission of evidence of a similar offense often does little to impeach the
credibility of a testifying defendant while undoubtedly prejudicing
him... [t]he generally accepted view... [wa]s that evidence of similar
offenses for impeachment purposes under Rule 609 should be admitted
sparingly if at all. 3 16
Under the fourth factor of the majority test and the third factor of the
minority test, courts considered the evidentiary need for the defendant's
testimony and thus the extent to which he would be deterred from testifying
if the prosecution was entitled to impeach him through prior convictions.317
As the defendant's testimony became less important to his trial, the
approved use of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes became less
prejudicial because the defendant might have had reasonable bases to decide
not to testify independent of the jury misusing the conviction as propensity
character evidence.318 Thus, when the defendant's state of mind, or, indeed,
even his actions, were not at issue and/or where the defendant's testimony
would have been substantially the same as that of other witnesses, there was
little need for him to testify and slight prejudicial effect in the approved use
of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes.31 9

For instance, in United States v. Causey, Michael Causey appealed to
the Seventh Circuit from his weapons-related convictions on the grounds
that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress weapons and
drugs recovered from his residence and permitting the prosecution to
impeach him through a prior felony conviction. 320 His argument on the
former ground was that the weapons and drugs were seized pursuant to a
search warrant which was based upon information from a confidential
informant and yet which "materially misstated the confidential informant's
true identity" and did not even indicate that he was a paid confidential
informant.3 21 The Seventh Circuit found this argument to be without merit
and then, in concluding that the trial court properly allowed the prosecution

315. See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note to the 1990 amendment.
316. United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414, 418-19 (4th Cir. 1981).
317. United States v. Causey, 9 F.3d 1341, 1344-45 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Causey did not obviously
need to testify to raise his various defenses-several other witnesses for Causey reiterated Causey's
testimony. Therefore, Causey could have decided not to testify and risk impeachment.").
318. 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE,
609.05[3][e] (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Mathew Bender 2d ed. 2008).
319. Id.
320. United States v. Causey, 9 F.3d 1341, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1993).
321. Id. at 1343.
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to impeach Causey, found that his testimony was not terribly important to
his trial.322 Beyond the obvious fact that Causey's trial solely hinged on the
behavior of the government and its confidential informant and not Causey's
actions or state of mind, the court found that "Causey did not obviously need
[because] several other witnesses for
to testify to raise his various defenses 323
Causey reiterated Causey's testimony.',
Conversely, when "inferences founded upon unexplained acts [we]re
likely to be heavily operative, there [wa]s a manifest need for the defendant
to testify, making the approved use of his prior convictions for impeachment
purposes more prejudicial. 324 This was true because the defendant's state
of mind-something only he could know-was likely the central issue in
such cases. For instance, in United States v. Paige, the defendant was
charged with knowing receipt and concealment of stolen securities, and the
prosecution sought to impeach him through a prior felony conviction in the
event that he testified.325 In addressing the importance of the defendant's
testimony, the court concluded that he needed to be able to testify to rebut
the inference of guilt the jury might otherwise draw from his possession of
the stolen securities.326
Under the fifth factor of the majority test and the fourth factor of the
minority test, courts considered how central the issue of the defendant's
credibility was to the resolution of his case.3 27 As the credibility issue
became more central to the resolution of the case, the probative value of the
conviction for impeachment purposes increased; the less central the
credibility issue, the less probative the conviction.3 28 When, as in most
trials, the case came down to the word of the defendant against the word of
prosecution witnesses, credibility was deemed "extremely important,"
rendering the conviction extremely probative. 329 This was especially true in
trials "based substantially on witness testimony, not necessarily physical
evidence.33° In some cases, however, the defendant's credibility was
deemed non-central to the resolution of a case, rendering the conviction less
probative. Thus, for instance, in THK America, Inc. v. NSK, Ltd., the court
found that the credibility of the defendant was not especially important to a

322. See id. at 1344.
323. Id.
324. WEINSTEIN, supra note 318.
325. 464 F. Supp. 99,100 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
326. Id. at 100-01.
327. E.g., United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
328. See id. at 54 ("[H]is credibility may be a central issue in the case, a factor favoring
admission.").
329. United States v. Rein, 848 F.2d 777, 783 (7th Cir. 1988).
330. Malone v. State, 829 So. 2d 1253, 1260 (Miss. App. 2002).
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patent case in which the main issues were validity, infringement, and
damages.33 i
Courts noted that these final two factors often counterbalanced.332 As

the defendant's testimony became more important, thus increasing the
conviction's prejudicial effect, his credibility typically became more central,
thus increasing the probative value of the conviction.

3

In some cases,

however, courts found that both of the last two factors favored admission by
misconstruing the fourth factor of the majority test and the third factor of the
minority test-the importance of the defendant's testimony-as being
directly 4 related to the conviction's probative value, not its prejudicial
33
effect.

It is important to note, though, courts did not consider these factors to be

an exhaustive list of what they could consider in weighing probative value
and prejudicial effect under Rule 609(a)(1). 335 For instance, another factor
courts frequently weighed was "the government's need for the impeaching
evidence," with a conviction's
probative value increasing as the conviction
336
increased in importance.
9.

Other Witnesses

This left the question of what balancing test courts should apply when

the witness to be impeached through a felony conviction was anyone other
than a testifying criminal defendant. In this regard, courts applied a plethora
of approaches.

Because Rule 609(a)(1) permitted impeachment through

evidence of a felony conviction, but only if "the court determine[d] that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweigh[ed] its prejudicial effect
to the [defendant], 33 7 some courts gave criminal defendants "the benefit of
the special balancing test when defense witnesses other than the defendant

331. 917 F. Supp. 563, 570-71 (N.D. I11.1996).
332. See, e.g., Brewer, 451 F. Supp. at 53.
333. See, e.g., id. at 54 ("Factors four and five seem to counterbalance each other in this case.
While Defendant's testimony may be of some importance, a factor favoring nonadmission, at the
same time his credibility may be a central issue in this case, a factor favoring admission.").
334. United States v. Ball, 547 F. Supp. 929, 934 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) ("Testimony of Mr. Coffey
was denied in toto by Mr. Ball, so that his testimony has assumed gigantic proportions and the issue
of the respective credibilities of Messrs. Ball and Coffey occupies a place of extreme centrality in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of Mr. Ball.").
335. Scalissi v. State, 759 N.E.2d 618, 625 (Ind. 2001) (noting that the list of five Rule 609(a)(1)
factors "is not exclusive").
336. United States v. Pritchard, 973 F.2d 905, 909 (1 th Cir. 1992).
337. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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were called to testify., 338 Conversely, other courts routinely admitted the
felony convictions of criminal defense witnesses without mentioning this
special balancing test, and sometimes without even mentioning the
traditional Rule 403 balancing test applied to most evidence. 39
And what did courts do with witnesses for the prosecution? Because, as
noted, the special balancing test only mentioned "prejudicial effect to the
defendant," "[s]ome courts ....read Rule 609(a)[(1)] as giving the
government no protection for its witnesses. 3 a° The "practical effect" of
such rulings was that felony convictions of witnesses for the prosecution
were per se admissible for impeachment purposes, without regard for Rule
609(a)(1)'s special balancing test or Rule 403.341 Meanwhile, while other
courts found that Rule 609(a)(1)'s special balancing test did not apply to
felony convictions used to impeach witnesses for the prosecution, they found
that they could deem such evidence inadmissible if "the less protective
balancing test of Rule 403 ...require[d] an exclusion of the evidence. 342

Courts faced similar problems in civil cases, alternatively: (1) applying
Rule 609(a)(1)'s special balancing test to civil defendants but not civil
plaintiffs; 343 (2) using "Rule 403 to provide the discretionary leverage
necessary to keep out prior convictions when their inclusion would be
unjust;" and (3) finding that the Rule 609(a)(1) "balancing test was never
meant to apply to civil cases at all, thereby making previous convictions in
this setting automatically admissible under the Rule's 'shall be admitted'
language."34
One influential opinion applying this last approach was the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Campbell v. Greer. 345 In Greer, Rudolph V. Campbell,
Jr. brought a section 1983 action against Illinois prison officials and guards,
claiming that they deprived him of his right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishments.346 The jury eventually entered a verdict in favor of the

338. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note to the 1990 amendment (emphasis added).
339. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 735 F.2d 289, 292-93 (8th Cir. 1984) (admitting evidence
of a defense witness's prior felony conviction without mentioning the special balancing test or Rule
403).
340. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note to the 1990 amendment (emphasis added).
341. United States v. Thome, 547 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1976) (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 30, 40,891
(1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)).
342. See, e.g., United States v. McCray, 15 MJ. 1086, 1089-90 (A.C.M.R. 1983).
343. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 n.6 (1989) ("Courts considering
admissibility of impeachment harmful to a civil defendant occasionally have allowed balancing
without questioning Rule 609(a)'s asymmetry when applied to the civil context.").
344. Voigtmann, supra note 224, at 930; see Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 119 (5th
Cir. 1983).
345. 831 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1987).
346. d.at 701.
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defendant, no doubt influenced by defense counsel's impeachment of
Campbell through evidence of his conviction for rape.347
On appeal, Campbell claimed that the trial judge erred by admitting
evidence of this conviction without first balancing its probative value against
its prejudicial effect.3 48 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, preliminarily finding
that Rule 609(a)(1) "requires such balancing only when there is prejudicial
effect 'to the defendant,"' not a plaintiff such as Campbell.3 49 The court,
however, took heed of Campbell's argument "that it would be absurd to read
the rule literally, for that would allow a defendant in a civil case, but not35a0
plaintiff, to complain about the use of his criminal record to impeach.,
The Seventh Circuit agreed that a literal reading of the Rule "would indeed
be absurd" and found that "Rule 609(a) can't mean what it says.""35 The
court also found, however, that Rule 609(a)(1) could not mean what
Campbell said and instead found that the Rule's balancing test only applied
to criminal defendants and that qualifying convictions were per se
admissible in civil cases, without even the failsafe of Rule 403. 352
Perhaps the most influential opinion 35 3 applying Rule 609(a)(1) to the
civil context was the Third Circuit's opinion in Diggs v. Lyon.354 In Diggs,
four inmates brought a section 1983 action which alleged that prison
officials used excessive force in preventing their escape from a Philadelphia
prison and denied them access to legal assistance. 355 After the trial court
entered a verdict in favor of the defendants, one of the plaintiffs appealed,
claiming, inter alia, that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to
impeach him through evidence of his felony convictions for murder, bank
robbery, attempted prison escape, and criminal conspiracy.356 The Third
Circuit disagreed, finding that the convictions were per se admissible for
impeachment purposes because the special balancing test of Rule 609(a)(1)
did not apply to civil plaintiffs and because "Rule 403 did not
give
357
discretionary authority to exclude them as prejudicial to the witness.,
347. /d. at 701-02.
348. Id. at 703.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 703-05.
353. See Voigtmnann, supra note 224, at 931 ("The roller coaster took another dip in the influential
case of Diggs v. Lyons.").
354. 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984).
355. Id. at 578.
356. Id.

357. Id. at 582.
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The Third Circuit, however, recognized that it was sacrificing reason at
the altar of the text of Rule 609(a)(1). The court specifically acknowledged
that its construction of the rule "may in some cases produce unjust and even
'
bizarre results."358
To wit, the majority noted that "[e]vidence that a witness
has in the past been convicted of manslaughter by automobile, for example,
can have but little relevance to his credibility as a witness in a totally
different matter., 35 9 Indeed, noting that the majority's construction of Rule
609(a)(1) would breed "concededly bizarre results," Judge Gibbons
dissented, joining those courts which had created the "reasonable
accommodation" of applying Rule 403 to convictions sought to be used for
impeachment purposes in civil cases. 360 Nonetheless, the majority felt
powerless to alter the language of the Rule, concluding that such an
amendment had to "be done by those who have the authority to amend the
rules, the Supreme Court and the Congress., 36' The Supreme Court,
however, failed to take the bait, denying certiorari 362 and waiting six years
before finally addressing the issue of how Rule 609(a)(1) applied in civil
cases.
The case in which the Supreme Court finally decided "the question [of]
whether Rule 609(a)(1) ... require[d] a judge to let a civil litigant impeach
an adversary's credibility with evidence of the adversary's prior felony
convictions" was Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. 363 In Bock Laundry,
the rotating drum of a dryer tore off the right arm of inmate Paul Green
during his work-release job at a car wash, and he later sued the manufacturer
of the machine. 364 During the ensuing trial, defense counsel impeached
Green through his admissions 365
that he had been convicted of conspiracy to
commit burglary and burglary.
After the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, Green appealed,
claiming that the trial judge misapplied Rule 609(a)(1). 366 His appeal
eventually reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed, concluding that Rule
609(a)(1) "requires a judge to permit impeachment of a civil witness with
evidence of prior felony convictions regardless of ensuant unfair prejudice to
the witness or the party offering the testimony. 3 67 In doing so, the Supreme
Court rejected a construction of Rule 609(a)(1) which would have given

358. Id.

359. Id.
360. Diggs, 741 F.2d at 582-83 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 582.
362. Diggs v. Lyons, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985).

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

490 U.S. 504, 505 (1989).
Id. at 506.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 527.

1046

HeinOnline -- 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 1046 2008-2009

[Vol. 36: 997, 2009]

Impeachable Offenses?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

civil defendants, but not civil plaintiffs, the benefit of either the Rule's
special balancing test or the Rule 403 balancing test.368 Instead, the Court
agreed with the Seventh Circuit that while the plain language of the Rule
would support such a result, "as far
as civil trials are concerned, Rule
369
609(a)(1) 'can't mean what it says. ,,
Meanwhile, in a concurring opinion that essentially mirrored the
majority opinion, 370 Justice Scalia highlighted the fact that he was
"correcting" Rule 609(a)(1) under the rule of absurdity, 37 1 which indicates
"that if a literal reading would produce an absurd result the interpreter is
free ...to depart in the direction of sense. 372 According to Scalia, Rule
609(a)(1) was "a statute which, if interpreted literally, produces an absurd,
and perhaps unconstitutional, result. 37 3 Scalia thus saw it as his task "to
give some alternative meaning to the word 'defendant' in Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(a)(1)" and found that interpreting the word "defendant" to
mean "criminal defendant" did the least violence to the Rule's text, leading
to the same conclusion as the majority.374

Finally, in a strongly worded dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, Justice Blackmun argued that "a better interpretation
of... Rule [609(a)(1)] would allow the trial court to consider the risk of
prejudice faced by any party, not just a criminal defendant," before
admitting a felony conviction for impeachment purposes. 3 75 Blackmun
contended that the majority's construction of the Rule "endorse[d] 'the
irrationality and unfairness' of denying the trial court the ability to weigh the
risk of prejudice to any party before admitting evidence of a prior felony for
purposes of impeachment., 376 He then concluded by indicating that his
"hope [wa]s that Rule 609(a)(1) will be corrected without delay, preferably
into a form that allows judicial oversight over, at the least, the use of any

368. Id.
at 510.
369. Id. at 511 (quoting Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (1987)).
370. Id. at 529 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I am frankly not sure that, despite its lengthy discussion
of ideological evolution and legislative history, the Court's reasons for both aspects of its decision
are much different from mine.").
371. Id. at 527.
372. Cent. States, Se. and Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods, Inc., 960 F.2d 1339,
1345 (7th Cir. 1992).
373. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (Scalia, J, concurring).
374. Id. at 527-29.
375. Id. at 530 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
376. Id. at 531 (internal citation omitted).
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felony conviction that does not bear directly on a witness's honesty., 377 The
next year, his prayer was answered.
10. 1990 Amendment
In 1990, Congress amended Rule 609(a)(1). Amended Rule 609(a)(1)
now reads:
[E]vidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted
of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that
an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if
the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.378
The amendment thus eliminated the two requirements of the Rule
which, as noted, courts had routinely ignored. 379 First, the amendment
removed "from the rule the limitation that the conviction may only be
elicited during cross-examination, a limitation that virtually every circuit
court ha[d] found to be inapplicable., 380 Instead, the Advisory Committee
affirmed the "common" practice of parties revealing their witness's
convictions on direct examination "to 'remove the sting' of the
impeachment.3 8 1 Second, the amendment removed the requirement that a
party could only establish that a witness had an impeachable conviction
through the public record or the witness's admission, in effect approving the
many decisions of courts that permitted parties to prove convictions through
other methods, such as "rap sheets. 382
The amendment, however, was mainly directed at the task left to it by
the Supreme Court in Bock Laundry383-resolving the "ambiguity as to the
relationship of Rules 609 and 403 with respect to the impeachment of
witnesses other than the criminal defendant., 384 The Committee began by
noting that the amendment did not "disturb the special balancing test for the

377. Id. at 535.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
See supranotes 232-233 and accompanying text.
FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note to the 1990 amendment.
Id. (citing United States v. Bad Cob, 560 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1977)).
See supranote 233 and accompanying text.
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co,490 U.S. 504, 508 (1989).
FED. R. EvID. 609 advisory committee's note to the 1990 amendment.
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criminal defendant who chooses to testify. 385 According to the Note, this
non-interference was based upon the recognition that:
[I]n virtually every case in which prior convictions are used to
impeach the testifying defendant, the defendant faces a unique risk
of prejudice-i.e., the danger that convictions that would be
excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 404 will be misused by a jury as
propensity evidence despite their introduction solely for
impeachment purposes. 386

The Committee then strongly implied that the burden of proof is on the
prosecution in such cases by stating that the Rule "requires that the
government show that the probative value 38of
7 convictions as impeachment
evidence outweighs their prejudicial effect.,
It next addressed those courts which had applied the special balancing
test not only to criminal defendants but also to any witnesses that they
called.388 The Committee bluntly rejected this practice, finding that "the
concern about unfairness to the [criminal] defendant is most acute when the
defendant's own convictions are offered as evidence."'389 Nonetheless, the
Committee recognized that "[t]here are cases in which a [criminal]
defendant might be prejudiced when a defense witness is impeached" such
as when "the witness bears a special relationship to the defendant such that
the defendant is likely to suffer some spill-over effect from impeachment of
the witness.

' 390

According to the Note, though, the amendment did "not

deprive the [criminal] defendant of any meaningful protection, since Rule
403 now clearly protects against unfair impeachment of any defense witness
other than the defendant. 39'
Indeed, both the text of the amended Rule and the Advisory Committee
Note made clear that the "ordinary balancing test of Rule 403" applies not
only to convictions offered to impeach a witness called by a criminal
defendant, but also to convictions offered to impeach civil plaintiffs and
defendants, the witnesses they call, and prosecution witnesses, i.e., the

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

390. FED. R. EVID, 609 advisory committee's note to the 1990 amendment.
391. Id.
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convictions of "any witness other than a criminal defendant. 3 92 Thus, a
court shall admit a felony conviction to impeach any witness besides a
criminal defendant unless it finds that "its prejudicial effect substantially
outweighs its probative value." The Advisory Committee's Note stated that
the purpose of this Rule 403 failsafe for all non-criminal defendant witnesses
was the same as the one articulated in the case of the witness called by the
criminal defendant: "Athough the danger that prior convictions will be
misused as character evidence is particularly acute when the [criminal]
393
defendant is impeached, the danger exists in other situations as well.
11. Disparate Treatment
Courts now treat testifying criminal defendants and civil parties (and all
other witnesses besides criminal defendants) in substantially different
regards, giving the former substantially more protection before admitting
their convictions under the amended Rule 609(a)(1). The first difference is
that courts continue to consider the aforementioned four 394 or five3 95 factors
before admitting convictions under Rule 609(a)(1) against a testifying
criminal defendant. Indeed, most appellate courts have found that if a trial
court does not make an explicit, on-the-record balancing of probative value
and prejudicial effect in such a criminal case, the case must be reversed or
remanded, absent a finding of harmless error.396 Conversely, courts almost

never consider these or other factors before allowing for the admission of
felony convictions against civil parties.397 Instead, most courts merely
mention that convictions are admissible under Rule 609(a)(1) to impeach
civil parties subject to the Rule 403 and then curtly proclaim that its
balancing test has been satisfied without any analysis.3 98

392. Id.
393. Id.
394. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
396. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 952 F.2d 914, 916-17 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[l]n order to admit
impeaching evidence of a prior conviction under Rule 609, a court must make an on-the-record
finding based on the facts that the conviction's probative value substantially outweighs its
prejudicial impact.").
397. See, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., 2006 WL 2644963 (E.D. Ky. 2006); but cf
Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685, 691 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Although we have never held that such
factors should be considered in a civil case, and do not do so here, we think that, under the
circumstances of this case, consideration of these factors by the district court on remand would be
appropriate.").
398. See Smith, 2006 WL 2644963 at *2 ("Because this Court finds that evidence of Plaintiffs
conviction and incarceration is relevant and that the probative value of the effect of Plaintiff's
conviction on her credibility is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, as
prohibited by Fed. R. Evid. 403, it shall be admitted pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 609.").
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Second, under Rule 609(a)(1) courts typically place the burden of proof
firmly on the prosecution to prove that a testifying criminal defendant's
399
felony conviction is admissible against him for impeachment purposes.
On the other hand, courts place the same burden on civil parties to prove that
their felony convictions
should be deemed inadmissible to impeach them
400
under Rule 609(a)(1).
As was noted in the introduction, though, what iseven more important
than who bears the burden of proof in these two situations is what that party
needs to prove. Under Rule 609(a)(1), when the prosecution seeks to
impeach a testifying criminal defendant through evidence of a qualifying
conviction, it must prove that the "probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused." 40 1
Therefore, the
prosecution can only use a qualifying conviction to impeach a testifying
criminal defendant under Rule 609(a)(1) if the conviction's bearing on his
honesty and veracity-its probative value-outweighs the danger that the
jury could use the conviction to conclude, "[o]nce a criminal, always a
criminal"-its unfairly prejudicial effect. If a conviction's prejudicial effect
outweighs its probative value by any degree or even if its probative
value
40 2
matches its prejudicial effect, a court is required to exclude it.
Based upon this framework, courts using four factors in this balancing
test exclude testifying criminal defendants' prior convictions under Rule
609(a)(1) even when two factors support admission and two factors weigh
against admission, as in United States v. Smith4 °3 and similar cases.
Meanwhile, courts using five factors alternatively require the prosecution to
prove that three or four of the factors weigh in favor of admissibility of the

399. See, e.g., United States v. Grove, 844 F. Supp. 1495, 1496 (D. Utah 1994) ("The burden is on
the prosecution.").
400. See, e.g., United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 164 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that while the
prosecution bears the burden of proof when it seeks to use a criminal defendant's felony conviction
to impeach him under Rule 609(a)(1), a civil party bears a similar burden in seeking to exclude such
evidence).
401. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(l).
402. See, e.g., Tussel v. Witco Chem. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 983 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (contrasting
the "heightened protection" of the special balancing test of Rule 609(a)(1) with the more limited
protection afforded by Rule 403).
403. See supra Part 1.
404. See, e.g., United States v. Graves, No. 06-95, 01, 2006 WL 1997378, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 12,
2006) ("Of the four factors to consider in admitting a conviction under Rule 609(a)(1), two weigh in
favor of admission in this case, and two weigh strongly against. Faced with this balance, the Court
concludes that the Government has not met its burden of showing that the probative value of the
1993 conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect.").
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conviction, with the difference frequently depending on the probative value
of the conviction.4 °5
For instance, in United States v. Mahone, the defendant was charged
with attempted bank robbery and interstate transport of a stolen vehicle, and
the prosecution sought, inter alia, to impeach him through evidence of his
convictions for possession of a controlled substance and robbery reduced to
aggravated assault.4 °6

The United States District Court for the District of

Maine implicitly found that the fourth and fifth factors counterbalanced and
explicitly found that the second and third factors supported admission of
these convictions because they occurred close in time to the subject charges
and were sufficiently dissimilar from those charges. 40 7 Nonetheless, because
the convictions had little to no bearing on the defendant's honesty and
veracity, the court precluded the prosecution from using them to impeach
him, despite three of the five factors supporting admissibility.4 8
Similarly, in United States v. Smith, the defendant was charged with
making counterfeit currency, and the prosecution sought, inter alia, to
impeach him through evidence of his conviction for drug possession. 40 9 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that
the fourth and fifth factors counterbalanced and that the second and third
factors supported admission of the conviction because it occurred close in
time to the subject charges and was sufficiently dissimilar from that
charge. 410 Despite these facts, because the court found that convictions for
drug possession have little to no bearing on an individual's honesty and
veracity, the court precluded the prosecution from using the conviction to
impeach the defendant.4 11
On the other side of the coin is the First Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Brito, in which the defendant was charged with firearm-related
crimes and the prosecution sought to impeach him through evidence of his
three drug-trafficking convictions.412 The First Circuit found that: (1) the
fourth and fifth factors counterbalanced; (2) the second factor weighed
against admission because the prior convictions were remote in time; (3) the
third factor supported admission because the offenses underlying the prior
convictions were not similar to the subject charges; and (4) the first factor
favored admission because drug-trafficking crimes have some bearing on

405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

See, eg., United States v. Mahone, 328 F. Supp. 2d 77, 77 (D. Me. 2004).
Id. at 81.
Id. at 84-85.
Id.
181 F. Supp. 2d 904,906, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
Id. at 909-10.
Id.
427 F.3d 53, 55-57 (1st Cir. 2005).
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413

veracity.
Unlike in the previous two cases, these factors were sufficient
despite the mere three-two split in favor of admissibility because of the
strong probative value of the prior convictions.41 4
However, when a party seeks to impeach a party in a civil case, the
analysis is reversed. Under Rule 609(a)(1), when a civil party seeks to
preclude the other party from impeaching him through evidence of a
qualifying conviction, the objecting party must establish under Rule 403 that
the conviction's bearing on his honesty and veracity-its probative valueis substantially outweighed by the danger that the jury could use the
conviction to conclude, "[o]nce a criminal, always a criminal"--its unfairly
prejudicial effect. 415 Thus, a court has to admit such a conviction if its
probative value and prejudicial effect are roughly commensurate or even if
the conviction's unfairly prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, but
not to a substantial degree.416

Accordingly, courts' analyses of the admissibility of qualifying
convictions of civil parties under Rule 609(a)(1) look quite different from
their analyses when the party to be impeached is a criminal defendant. In
most civil cases, courts allow for the admission of qualifying convictions
with a conclusory claim that Rule 403 has been satisfied and without any
actual balancing of probative value and unfairly prejudicial effect. 4 17 For
instance, in Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, East, L.P., a plaintiff civilly sued

Wal-Mart for injuries she allegedly sustained while she was shopping and
moved to preclude the superstore from impeaching her through evidence of
her conviction for distributing cocaine. 418 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky quickly disposed of her motion, with the
only sentence of its opinion mentioning Rule 403, probative value, or
prejudicial effect stating:
Because this Court finds that evidence of Plaintiff's conviction and
incarceration is relevant and that the probative value of the effect of
Plaintiffs conviction on her credibility is not substantially

413. Id. at 64.
414. Id.
415. See FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(1).
416. See, e.g., United States v. McBride, No. 93-3218, 1994 WL 64679 at *8 n.3 (6th Cir. Mar. 1,
1994) ("Under this test, a district court may admit evidence where the probative value is equal to, or
even a bit less than, its prejudicial effect.").
417. See, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., No. 5:05-224-JMH, 2006 WL 2644963 (E.D.
Ky. Sept. 14, 2006).
418. Id. at *2.
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outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, as prohibited by Fed.
R. Evid. 403, it shall be admitted pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 609.419
And while the plaintiffs conviction for distributing cocaine in Smith
was at least for a crime thought to have some bearing on veracity, 420 courts
also frequently admit evidence of qualifying convictions against civil parties
under Rule 609(a)(1) even when those convictions are based upon crimes
thought to have little to no bearing on witness credibility, as in Saunders.42'
Courts in civil cases also seem relatively unimpressed with the fact that a
civil party's prior conviction is for the same type of crime as the crime for
which he is charged, frequently admitting these types of convictions for
422
impeachment purposes despite their inevitable unfairly prejudicial effect.
Indeed, felony "convictions 4are
23 routinely admitted to impeach" civil
plaintiffs under Rule 609(a)(1 ).
12. Addendum: Amended Rule 609(a)(2) and Rule 609(e)
By 2006, courts had taken at least four different approaches in
determining which crimes qualified as crimes of "dishonesty or false
statement" under Rule 609(a)(2), including one approach which "essentially
read the word 'dishonesty' out of the Rule" and another which classified
"virtually any crime.., as a crime of 'dishonesty.' ' 424 In 2006, Congress
amended the Rule to preclude these pro-admissibility approaches such that
"Rule 609(a)(2) [now] mandates the admission of evidence of a conviction
only when the conviction required the proof of... an act of dishonesty or
false statement., 425 As was the case before the amendment, the Rule applies
equally in both criminal and civil cases.426

Meanwhile, Federal Rule of

Evidence 609(e) states that in either a civil or criminal case the pendency of
an appeal does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible but that
"[e]vidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 427
419. Id.
420. See supra note 411 and accompanying text.
421. See supra Part 1.
422. See, e.g., Hickson, Corp. v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 903, 903-04 (E.D. Tenn.
2002) (allowing for the defendant to be impeached through evidence of its felony conviction for
improper disposal of paint at rail yard in its trial for damages allegedly incurred as result of chemical
spill).
423. Saunders v. City of Chicago, 320 F. Supp. 2d 735, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
424. Stuart P. Green, Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2)
and the Origins ofCrimen Falsi, 90 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1087, 1116-19 (2000).
425. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) advisory committee's note to the 2006 amendment.
426. E.g., Marlene B. Hanson, Note, Balancing Prejudice in Admitting Prior Felony Convictions
in Civil Actions: Resolving the 609(a)(1)-403 Conflict, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 333, 338 n.32
(1988).
427. FED. R. EVID. 609(e).
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IV. COURTS SHOULD TREAT CIVIL PARTIES THE SAME AS CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS UNDER THE FELONY IMPEACHMENT RULE

As noted, a substantial minority of federal courts before 2006 allowed,
and some states still allow, parties in quasi-criminal cases to use the "mercy
rule" to the same extent as criminal defendants. 428 The rationale these courts
used for extending the "mercy rule" to civil parties in quasi-criminal cases
was that these cases were in enough respects similar to criminal cases,
justifying parallel treatment.4 29 This rationale is equally applicable when a
party seeks to impeach the opposing party in a quasi-criminal case through a
conviction under Rule 609(a)(1), which supports treating civil parties in
quasi-criminal cases the same as criminal defendants under the Rule.
Nonetheless, despite courts largely ignoring the plain language of most
provisions of Rule 609, no court has ever followed suit and treated civil
parties in quasi-criminal cases the same as criminal defendants under Rule
609(a)(1). 4 0 There are only three possible obstacles to such parallel
treatment: (1) the argument that the same reasons supporting the decision to
limit the "mercy rule" to criminal cases apply in the Rule 609(a)(1) context;
(2) the argument that the Rule's criminal defendant protections are uniquely
suited to criminal defendants; and (3) the argument that courts should
respect the text of Rule 609(a)(1), which expressly limits the special
balancing test to criminal defendants.
A.

Possible Substantive Objections to the Extension
1. The Reasons Behind the Amendment

As previously noted, the rationale behind the decisions extending the
"mercy rule" to civil parties in quasi-criminal cases was that these cases
were in most respects similar to criminal cases, justifying parallel
treatment. 43' The courts rejecting this minority line of precedent did so not
because of substantive objections but because they felt duty bound to adhere
to the plain text of Rules 404(a)(1) & (2). In 2006, Congress proscribed this

428. See supra Part II.C.2.ii(l).
429. See supra Part II.C.2.ii(2).
430. Before this article, it appears that no court or scholar has addressed the issue of whether
courts should treat civil parties in quasi-criminal cases the same as criminal defendants under Rule
609(a)(1).
431. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
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minority practice by amending Rules 404(a)(1) and (2) so that they only
applied in criminal cases.432
The Advisory Committee's first reason was the fact that "[t]he
circumstantial use of character evidence is generally discouraged because it
carries serious risks of prejudice, confusion, and delay.' '433 And while the
Advisory Committee found that certain considerations trumped this
reluctance to admit propensity character evidence when it was the criminal
defendant who sought to admit it, the Committee could not justify extending
the same "mercy rule" to the civil arena.434
This rationale is consistent with the other Federal Rules of Evidence
dealing with propensity character evidence or evidence which can be
misused as propensity character evidence. As detailed above, with one
notable exception, every Federal Rule of Evidence that deals with propensity
character evidence or evidence which can be misused as propensity
character evidence makes it either: (a) as difficult to admit such evidence in
civil trials as it is in criminal trials, or (b) more difficult to admit such
evidence in civil trials than it is in criminal trials.
437
Under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a),435 404(b),436 405(a) & (b),
4
4
2
4
4'
4
4
412(a), 438 413-415,439 607, 0608(a) & (b), 609(a)(2), (b), (c), and (e), it
is just as difficult to admit character evidence in civil cases as it is in
criminal cases. Meanwhile, Rule 412(b)(2) makes it much more difficult for
civil defendants to get character evidence through the rape shield than it is
for criminal defendants to breach its protections under Rules 412(b)(1)(A),
(B), and (C). 44 3 And Rule 609(d) per se precludes evidence of juvenile
adjudications from being admitted in civil trials for impeachment purposes
while it allows for their admission in some criminal trials for the same
purpose when offered by either the defendant or the prosecution. 4 "
Ostensibly, the decision to prevent courts from applying the "mercy rule" in
quasi-criminal cases reflected the judgment that Rules 404(a)(1) and (2)
should fall into the latter, rather than the former, category, making it more

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

See supra Part I.C.2.ii(3).
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note to the 2006 amendments.
See infra notes 435-457.
See supranotes 80-82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 91, 194 and accompanying text.
See supranote 152 and accompanying text.
See supranote 185 and accompanying text.
See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 245, 271, 281, 427 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 166-175 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 283, 294 and accompanying text.
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difficult, indeed impossible, to admit this type of propensity character
evidence in all civil trials.
This constellation of Rules and the aversion toward admitting evidence
that can be misused as propensity character evidence, however, points
toward treating civil parties in quasi-criminal cases the same as criminal
defendants under Rule 609(a)(1). The proverbial sore thumb mentioned
above is Rule 609(a)(1), which makes it significantly easier to admit
evidence which can be misused as propensity character evidence in civil
trials than it is in criminal trials. As noted above, (1) Rule 609(a)(1)'s
special balancing test for criminal defendants, (2) the requirement of on-therecord balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect for criminal
defendants' convictions, and (3) the burden of proof on the prosecution (the
party seeking to admit the conviction) all make the exclusion of a testifying
criminal defendant's felony convictions much more likely than the exclusion
of a civil party's convictions. 445 Moreover, the Advisory Committee itself
recognized that the admission of any witness's convictions for impeachment
purposes risks "the danger that prior convictions will be misused as
character evidence."" 6 Because Rule 609(a)(1) evidence is clearly evidence
that can be misused as propensity character evidence in quasi-criminal trials,
the first reason behind the decision to preclude the application of the "mercy
rule" in civil cases thus strongly supports treating civil parties in quasicriminal cases the same as criminal defendants.
The second reason behind the Advisory Committee's decision at first
appears more problematic. The Committee found that the "mercy rule"
uniquely applies to criminal defendants and allows them to overcome the
dangers inherent in admitting propensity character evidence "because the
accused, whose liberty is at stake, may need 'a counterweight against the
strong investigative and prosecutorial resources of the government.' 447 In
other words, the "mercy rule" exists "'to allow the criminal defendant with
so much at stake and so little available in the way of conventional proof to
have special dispensation to tell the factfinder just what sort of person he
really is.,,448
Perhaps, then, one could argue that these same factors justify the
disparate treatment that criminal defendants and civil parties receive under
Rule 609(a)(1). One relevant retort to such an argument is that the Advisory

445.
446.
447.
448.

See supra notes 394-423 and accompanying text.
See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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Committee's analysis was flatly fallacious or at least drew a false
dichotomy. Many criminal defendants do not have their liberty at stake and
merely face fines if convicted 449 while individuals in certain civil trials, such
as civil confinement cases, can face the loss of their liberty.45 ° Moreover, it
is at least arguable that a civil party facing millions of dollars in damages or
a determination that he caused the wrongful death of another has more at
stake than certain criminal defendants, such as those facing possible
incarceration measured in months, not years. Finally, many white collar
criminals likely have stronger resources than the prosecution while a large
percentage of the civil parties in quasi-criminal cases seeking to preclude the
admission of their felony convictions for impeachment purposes are either
(1) inmates bringing section 1983 actions against the state45' or (2)
individuals defending actions brought against them by governmental
entities, 45 2 mirroring the typical power disparity present in many criminal
trials.
A second, stronger retort to such an argument is that criminal defendants
would still have an advantage vis-A-vis civil plaintiffs and a counterweight
against the prosecution's resources even if Rule 609(a)(1)'s criminal
defendant protections are extended to civil parties in quasi-criminal cases.
Currently, at a quasi-criminal trial, if a judgment against either the plaintiff
or the defendant would necessitate a finding that they committed a particular
act that was also punishable under criminal law, such as an assault case
where the defendant claims self-defense, they can each impeach the other
through a qualifying conviction unless such impeachment would violate
Rule 403. Affording both parties the benefit of Rule 609(a)(1)'s special
balancing test, placing the burden of proof on the party seeking to admit the
conviction, and requiring an on-the-record balancing of probative value and
prejudicial effect would give neither civil party any advantage; it would
simply make it more difficult for either to impeach the other through
evidence of a felony conviction.
Conversely, criminal defendants enjoy such an advantage over the
prosecution. The prosecution can only impeach a testifying criminal
defendant under Rule 609(a)(1) by establishing that the probative value of
his felony conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect while a criminal
defendant can impeach witnesses for the prosecution unless the prosecution
can establish that such impeachment violates Rule 403, with its more liberal

449. See, e.g., OR.
450.
451.
452.
453.
1995).

REV. STAT.

§ 475.992(4)(f.

See, e.g., Detention of Marshall v. State, 125 P.3d 111 (Wash. 2005).
See Voigtmann, supra note 224, at 946.
See, e.g., supra notes 127-134 and accompanying text.
E.g., Bustamante v. Thedford, No. 89 C 3471, 1995 WL 76900, at *1-2 (N.D. II1.Feb. 23,
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standard of admissibility.454 Thus, Rule 609(a)(1) already tips the scales
toward the criminal defendant, and extending its criminal defendant
protections to civil plaintiffs and defendants in quasi-criminal cases would
not tip the scale toward either side.
Consequently, the Advisory
Committee's reasons for restricting the "mercy rule" to criminal defendants
do not support restricting Rule 609(a)(1)'s protections to criminal
defendants, especially when doing so makes the admission of evidence that
can be misused as propensity character evidence significantly easier in civil
trials than it is in criminal trials, in contravention to all other Federal Rules
of Evidence on the subject.
2.

The "Uniquely Suited" Argument

The second potential objection to extending Rule 609(a)(1)'s criminal
defendant protections to civil plaintiffs in quasi-criminal cases is that those
protections are uniquely suited to criminal defendants because they have the
right to decide whether to testify, and too readily admitting evidence of their
felony convictions for impeachment purposes unfairly burdens their right to
testify.455 Indeed, many commentators have noted that even with Rule
609(a)(1)'s criminal defendant protections, courts provisionally approve the
admission of enough felony convictions for impeachment purposes to deter
even many innocent criminal defendants from testifying.456
Nonetheless, while these factors undoubtedly make the Rule's criminal
defendant protections proper, a different concern justifies applying those
same protections to civil parties in quasi-criminal cases. Rule 609(a)(1)'s
rulings that deter criminal defendants from testifying are harmful because
they prevent the jury from hearing their testimony; that said, it is still the
defendant who makes this choice, and by doing so, he prevents the jury from
misusing his conviction(s) as propensity character evidence. Conversely,
civil parties can be forced to testify, making them, "like any other witness,
subject to impeachment under the Federal Rules." 4"57 Thus, while criminal
defendants with felony convictions face the Solomonic choice of deciding

454. See supranotes 385, 392 and accompanying text.
455. Cf Gold, supra note 226, at 2313-14.
456. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules
That Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 865 (2008) ("Given the general
prohibition of evidence of a defendant's prior convictions as substantive evidence, however, a rule
permitting the use of that evidence to impeach a testifying defendant assumes great significance in
deterring even innocent defendants from testifying.").
457. Alprin, supra note 49, at 2090.
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whether or not to testify, civil parties in quasi-criminal cases with such
convictions have no choice and must have their criminal pasts aired out in
the courtroom, unless those convictions fail the probative value/prejudicial
tightrope. Based upon these facts, this tightrope should not be the liberal
Rule 403 balancing test applied to non-party witnesses, but the special
balancing test applied to criminal defendants. Nor should these parties have
the burden of establishing that their convictions are irrelevant or have to
suffer judicial opinions admitting those without any detailed balancing of
probative value and prejudicial effect.
B.

The Text of Rule 609(a)(1)

The second obstacle to treating civil parties in quasi-criminal cases the
same as criminal defendants under Rule 609(a)(1) is that the Rule singles out
"the accused" for special treatment.458 Of course, despite the fact that Rules
404(a)(1) and 404(a)(2) similarly stated that the "mercy rule" solely
protected "the accused," a substantial minority of courts ignored this
language for decades and extended its reach to civil parties in quasi-criminal
cases. 459 Nonetheless, Congress rebuked this practice in 2006, and the
majority of courts always felt duty bound to adhere to the plain meaning and
intent behind these Rules. Why then, should courts ignore the plain text of
Rule 609(a)(1)?
As indicated above, while there is a long standing and respected
tradition of limiting the admission of propensity character evidence, 460 courts
have paid no similar reverence to Rule 609. Instead, many courts have flatly
rejected the plain text of several of its provisions, with the most frequent
target of this insouciance being Rule 609(a) and its subsections. 46, Indeed,
courts have viewed Rule 609 as giving them "license to exercise virtually
unrestricted discretion" and "improperly rewrite[ten] both the history and
language of [Rule 609(a)]. 462 Given this judicial irreverence, indeed scorn,
toward the plain text of Rule 609 generally and Rule 609(a) specifically, the
fact that Rule 609(a)(1) singles out "the accused" for special treatment
should not preclude courts from extending its protections to civil plaintiffs in
quasi-criminal trials.

458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
See supranotes 110-138 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 234-236, 268-269, 280-281, 340-377, 424 and accompanying text.
See Gold, supra note 226, at 2296, 2328.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

With one exception, every Federal Rule of Evidence dealing with
propensity character evidence or evidence which can be misused as
propensity character evidence makes it either: (a) as difficult to admit such
evidence in civil trials as it is in criminal trials, or (b) more difficult to admit
such evidence in civil trials than it is in criminal trials. The "mercy rule"
falls into this latter category as it allows criminal defendants to inject the
issue of character into their trials while a similar luxury is not afforded to
civil parties. Before 2006, however, a substantial minority of courts
extended the "mercy rule" to civil parties in quasi-criminal cases because
they were in most respects similar to criminal cases. Congress finally shut
the door to this practice based upon the serious risks of prejudice, confusion,
and delay that propensity character evidence engenders.
These same risks, however, support treating civil parties in quasicriminal cases the same as criminal defendants under Rule 609(a), the felony
impeachment rule. That Rule makes it much more difficult for courts to
exclude the felony convictions of civil parties than it is for them to exclude
the felony convictions of testifying criminal defendants. It is thus the only
Federal Rule of Evidence which makes it easier to admit evidence which
can be misused as propensity character evidence in civil trials than it is in
criminal trials. Courts should correct this anomaly by treating civil parties in
quasi-criminal cases the same as criminal defendants under the Rule, and
their persistent lack of reverence for various provisions of Rule 609 means
that there is no obstacle to such parallel treatment.
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